Microsoft

Hawkeye Keylogger – Reborn v8: An in-depth campaign analysis

Microsoft Malware Protection Center - Wed, 07/11/2018 - 2:50pm

Much of cybercrime today is fueled by underground markets where malware and cybercriminal services are available for purchase. These markets in the deep web commoditize malware operations. Even novice cybercriminals can buy malware toolkits and other services they might need for malware campaigns: encryption, hosting, antimalware evasion, spamming, and many others.

Hawkeye Keylogger (also known as iSpy Keylogger) is an info-stealing malware thats being sold as malware-as-a-service. Over the years, the malware authors behind Hawkeye have improved the malware service, adding new capabilities and techniques. It was last used in a high-volume campaign in 2016.

This year marked the resurgence of Hawkeye. In April, malware authors started peddling a new version of the malware that they called Hawkeye Keylogger – Reborn v8. Not long after, on April 30, Office 365 Advanced Threat Protection (Office 365 ATP) detected a high-volume campaign that distributed the latest variants of this keylogger.

At the onset, Office 365 ATP blocked the email campaign and protected customers, 52% of whom are in the software and tech sector. Companies in the banking (11%), energy (8%), chemical (5%), and automotive (5%) industries are also among the top targets

Figure 1. Top industries targeted by the April 2018 Hawkeye campaign

Office 365 ATP uses intelligent systems that inspect attachments and links for malicious content to protect customers against threats like Hawkeye in real time. These automated systems include a robust detonation platform, heuristics, and machine learning models. Office 365 ATP uses intelligence from various sensors, including multiple capabilities in Windows Defender Advanced Threat Protection (Windows Defender ATP).

Windows Defender AV (a component of Windows Defender ATP) detected and blocked the malicious attachments used in the campaign in at least 40 countries. United Arab Emirates accounted for 19% of these file encounters, while the Netherlands (15%), the US (11%), South Africa (6%) and the UK (5%) make the rest of the top 5 countries that saw the lure documents used in the campaign. A combination of generic and heuristic protections in Windows Defender AV (TrojanDownloader:O97M/Donoff, Trojan:Win32/Tiggre!rfn, Trojan:Win32/Bluteal!rfn, VirTool:MSIL/NetInject.A) ensured these threats are blocked in customer environments.

Figure 2. Top countries that encountered malicious documents used in the Hawkeye campaign

As part of our job to protect customers from malware attacks, Office 365 ATP researchers monitor malware campaigns like Hawkeye and other developments in the cybercriminal landscape. Our in-depth investigation into malware campaigns like Hawkeye and many others adds to the vast threat intelligence we get from the Microsoft Intelligent Security Graph, which enables us to continuously raise the bar in security. Through the Intelligent Security Graph, security technologies in Microsoft 365 share signals and detections, allowing these technologies to automatically update protection and detection mechanisms, as well as orchestrate remediation across Microsoft 365.

Figure 3. Microsoft 365 threat protection against Hawkeye

Campaign overview

Despite its name, Hawkeye Keylogger – Reborn v8 is more than a common keylogger. Over time, its authors have integrated various modules that provide advanced functionalities like stealth and detection evasion, as well as credential theft and more.

Malware services like Hawkeye are advertised and sold in the deep web, which requires anonymity networks like Tor to access, etc. Interestingly, the Hawkeye authors advertised their malware and even published tutorial videos on a website on the surface web (that has since been taken down). Even more interesting, based on underground forums, it appears the malware authors have employed intermediary resellers, an example of how cybercriminal underground business models expand and evolve.

Our investigation into the April 2018 Hawkeye campaign shows that the cybercriminals have been preparing for the operation since February, when they registered the domains they later used in the campaign.

Typical of malware campaigns, the cybercriminals undertook the following steps:

  • Built malware samples and malware configuration files using a malware builder they acquired from the underground
  • Built weaponized documents to be used a social engineering lure (possibly by using another tool bought in the underground)
  • Packed or obfuscated the samples (using a customized open-source packer)
  • Registered domains for delivery of malware
  • Launched a spam campaign (possibly using a paid spam service) to distribute the malware

Like other malware toolkits, Hawkeye comes with an admin panel that cybercriminals use to monitor and control the attack.

Figure 4: Hawkeyes admin panel

Interestingly, some of the methods used in this Hawkeye campaign are consistent with previous attacks. This suggests that the cybercriminals behind this campaign may be the same group responsible for malware operations that delivered the remote access tool (RAT) Remcos and the info-stealing bot malware Loki. The following methods were used in these campaigns:

  • Multiple documents that create a complicated, multi-stage delivery chain
  • Redirections using shortened bit.ly links
  • Use of malicious macro, VBScript, and PowerShell scripts to run the malware; the Remcos campaign employed an exploit for CVE-2017-0199 but used the same domains
  • Consistent obfuscation technique across multiple samples
Point of entry

In late April, Office 365 ATP analysts spotted a new spam campaign with the subject line RFQ-GHFD456 ADCO 5647 deadline 7th May carrying a Word document attachment named Scan Copy 001.doc. While the attachments file name extension was .doc, it was in fact a malicious Office Open XML format document, which usually uses a .docx file name extension.

In total, the campaign used four different subject lines and five attachments.

Figure 5: Sample emails used in the Hawkeye campaign

Because the attachment contains malicious code, Microsoft Word opens with a security warning. The document uses a common social engineering lure: it displays a fake message and an instruction to Enable editing and Enable content.

Figure 6: The malicious document with social engineering lure

The document contains an embedded frame that connects to a remote location using a shortened URL.

Figure 7: frame in settings.rels.xml on the document

The frame loads an .rtf file from hxxp://bit[.]ly/Loadingwaitplez, which redirects to hxxp://stevemike-fireforce[.]info/work/doc/10.doc.

Figure 8: RTF loaded as a frame inside malicious document

The RTF has an embedded malicious .xlsx file with macro as an OLE object, which in turn contains a stream named PACKAGE that contains the .xlsx contents.

The macro script is mostly obfuscated, but the URL to the malware payload is notably in plaintext.

Figure 9: Obfuscated macro entry point

De-obfuscating the entire script makes its intention clear. The first section uses PowerShell and the System.Net.WebClient object to download the malware to the path C:\Users\Public\svchost32.exe and execute it.

The macro script then terminates both winword.exe and excel.exe. In specific scenarios where Microsoft Word overrides default settings and is running with administrator privileges, the macro can delete Windows Defender AVs malware definitions. It then changes the registry to disable Microsoft Offices security warnings and safety features.

In summary, the campaigns delivery comprises of multiple layers of components that aim to evade detection and possibly complicate analysis by researchers.

Figure 10: The campaigns delivery stages

The downloaded payload, svchost32.exe, is a .NET assembly named Millionare that is obfuscated using a custom version of ConfuserEx, a well-known open-source .NET obfuscator.

Figure 11: Obfuscated .NET assembly Millionare showing some of the scrambled names

The obfuscation modifies the .NET assemblys metadata such that all the class and variable names are non-meaningful and scrambled names in Unicode. This obfuscation causes some analysis tools like .NET Reflector to show some namespaces or classes names as blank, or in some cases, display parts of the code backwards.

Figure 12: .NET Reflector presenting the code backwards due to obfuscation

Finally, the .NET binary loads an unpacked .NET assembly, which includes DLL files embedded as resources in the portable executable (PE).

Figure 13: Loading the unpacked .NET assembly during run-time

Malware loader

The DLL that initiates the malicious behavior is embedded as a resource in the unpacked .NET assembly. It is loaded in memory using process hollowing, a code injection technique that involves spawning a new instance of a legitimate process and then hollowing it out, i.e., replacing the legitimate code with malware.

Figure 14: In-memory unpacking of the malware using process hollowing.

Unlike previous Hawkeye variants (v7), which loaded the main payload into its own process, the new Hawkeye malware injects its code into MSBuild.exe, RegAsm.exe, and VBC.exe, which are signed executables that ship with .NET framework. This is an attempt to masquerade as a legitimate process.

Figure 15: Obfuscated calls using .NET reflection to perform process hollowing injection routine that injects the malwares main payload into RegAsm.exe

Additionally, in the previous version, the process hollowing routine was written in C. In the new version, this routine is completely rewritten as a managed .NET that calls the native Windows API.

Figure 16: Process hollowing routine implemented in .NET using native API function calls

Malware functionalities

The new Hawkeye variants created by the latest version of the malware toolkit have multiple sophisticated functions for information theft and evading detection and analysis.

Information theft

The main keylogger functionality is implemented using hooks that monitor key presses, as well as mouse clicks and window context, along with clipboard hooks and screenshot capability.

It has specific modules for extracting and stealing credentials from the following applications:

  • Beyluxe Messenger
  • Core FTP
  • FileZilla
  • Minecraft (replaced the RuneScape module in previous version)

Like many other malware campaigns, it uses the legitimate BrowserPassView and MailPassView tools to dump credentials from the browser and email client. It also has modules for taking screenshots of the desktop, as well as the webcam, if it exists.

Notably, the malware has a mechanism to visit certain URLs for click-based monetization.

Stealth and anti-analysis

On top of the processes hollowing technique, this malware uses other methods for stealth, including alternate data streams that remove mark of the web (MOTW) from the malwares downloaded files.

This malware can be configured to delay execution by any number of seconds, a technique used mainly to avoid detection by various sandboxes.
It prevents antivirus software from running using an interesting technique. It adds keys to the registry location HKLM\Software\Windows NT\Current Version\Image File Execution Options and sets the Debugger value for certain processes to rundll32.exe, which prevents execution. It targets the following processes related to antivirus and other security software:

  • AvastSvc.exe
  • AvastUI.exe
  • avcenter.exe
  • avconfig.exe
  • avgcsrvx.exe
  • avgidsagent.exe
  • avgnt.exe
  • avgrsx.exe
  • avguard.exe
  • avgui.exe
  • avgwdsvc.exe
  • avp.exe
  • avscan.exe
  • bdagent.exe
  • ccuac.exe
  • ComboFix.exe
  • egui.exe
  • hijackthis.exe
  • instup.exe
  • keyscrambler.exe
  • mbam.exe
  • mbamgui.exe
  • mbampt.exe
  • mbamscheduler.exe
  • mbamservice.exe
  • MpCmdRun.exe
  • MSASCui.exe
  • MsMpEng.exe
  • msseces.exe
  • rstrui.exe
  • spybotsd.exe
  • wireshark.exe
  • zlclient.exe

Further, it blocks access to certain domains that are usually associated with antivirus or security updates. It does this by modifying the HOSTS file. The list of domains to be blocked is determined by the attacker using a config file.

This malware protects its own processes. It blocks the command prompt, registry editor, and task manager. It does this by modifying registry keys for local group policy administrative templates. It also constantly checks active windows and renders action buttons unusable if the window title matches ProcessHacker, Process Explorer, or Taskmgr.

Meanwhile, it prevents other malware from infecting the machine. It repeatedly scans and removes any new values to certain registry keys, stops associated processes, and deletes related files.

Hawkeye attempts to avoid automated analysis. The delay in execution is designed to defeat automated sandbox analysis that allots only a certain time for malware execution and analysis. It likewise attempts to evade manual analysis by monitoring windows and exiting when it finds the following analysis tools:

  • Sandboxie
  • Winsock Packet Editor Pro
  • Wireshark
Defending mailboxes, endpoints, and networks against persistent malware campaigns

Hawkeye illustrates the continuous evolution of malware in a threat landscape fueled by the cybercriminal underground. Malware services make malware accessible to even unsophisticated operators, while simultaneously making malware more durable with advanced techniques like in-memory unpacking and abuse of .NETs CLR engine for stealth. In this blog we covered the capabilities of its latest version, Hawkeye Keylogger – Reborn v8, highlighting some of the enhancements from the previous version. Given its history, Hawkeye is likely to release a new version in the future.

Organizations should continue educating their employees about spotting and preventing social engineering attacks. After all, Hawkeyes complicated infection chain begins with a social engineering email and lure document. A security-aware workforce will go a long way in securing networks against attacks.

More importantly, securing mailboxes, endpoints, and networks using advanced threat protection technologies can prevent attacks like Hawkeye, other malware operations, and sophisticated cyberattacks.

Our in-depth analysis of the latest version and our insight into the cybercriminal operation that drives this development allow us to proactively build robust protections against both known and unknown threats.

Office 365 Advanced Threat Protection (Office 365 ATP) protects mailboxes as well as files, online storage, and applications from malware campaigns like Hawkeye. It uses a robust detonation platform, heuristics, and machine learning to inspect attachments and links for malicious content in real-time, ensuring that emails that carry Hawkeye and other threats dont reach mailboxes and devices. Learn how to add Office 365 ATP to existing Exchange or Office 365 plans.

Windows Defender Antivirus (Windows Defender AV) provides an additional layer of protection by detecting malware delivered through email, as well as other infection vectors. Using local and cloud-based machine learning, Windows Defender AVs next-gen protection can block even new and unknown threats on Windows 10 and Windows 10 in S mode.

Additionally, endpoint detection and response (EDR) capabilities in Windows Defender Advanced Threat Protection (Windows Defender ATP) expose sophisticated and evasive malicious behavior, such as those used by Hawkeye. Sign up for free Windows Defender ATP trial.

Windows Defender ATPs rich detection libraries are powered by machine learning and allows security operations teams to detect and respond to anomalous attacks in the network. For example, machine learning detection algorithms surface the following alert when Hawkeye uses a malicious PowerShell to download the payload:

Figure 16: Windows Defender ATP alert for Hawkeyes malicious PowerShell component

Windows Defender ATP also has behavior-based machine learning algorithms that detect the payload itself:

Figure 17: Windows Defender ATP alert for Hawkeyes payload

These security technologies are part of the advanced threat protection solutions in Microsoft 365. Enhanced signal sharing across services in Windows, Office 365, and Enterprise Mobility + Security through the Microsoft Intelligent Security Graph enables the automatic update of protections and orchestration of remediation across Microsoft 365.

 

 

Office 365 ATP Research

 

 

Indicators of Compromise (Ioc) Email subject lines
  • {EXT} NEW ORDER ENQUIRY #65563879884210#
  • B/L COPY FOR SHIPMENT
  • Betreff: URGENT ENQ FOR Equipment
  • RFQ-GHFD456 ADCO 5647 deadline 7th May
Attachment file names
  • Betreff URGENT ENQ FOR Equipment.doc
  • BILL OF LADING.doc
  • NEW ORDER ENQUIRY #65563879884210#.doc
  • Scan Copy 001.doc
  • Swift Copy.doc
Domains
  • lokipanelhostingpanel[.]gq
  • stellarball[.]com
  • stemtopx[.]com
  • stevemike-fireforce[.]info
Shortened redirector links
  • hxxp://bit[.]ly/ASD8239ASdmkWi38AS (was also used in a Remcos campaign)
  • hxxp://bit[.l]y/loadingpleaswaitrr
  • hxxp://bit[.l]y/Loadingwaitplez

Files (SHA-256)

  • d97f1248061353b15d460eb1a4740d0d61d3f2fcb41aa86ca6b1d0ff6990210a – .eml
  • 23475b23275e1722f545c4403e4aeddf528426fd242e1e5e17726adb67a494e6 – .eml
  • 02070ca81e0415a8df4b468a6f96298460e8b1ab157a8560dcc120b984ba723b – .eml
  • 79712cc97a19ae7e7e2a4b259e1a098a8dd4bb066d409631fb453b5203c1e9fe – .eml
  • 452cc04c8fc7197d50b2333ecc6111b07827051be75eb4380d9f1811fa94cbc2 – .eml
  • 95511672dce0bd95e882d7c851447f16a3488fd19c380c82a30927bac875672a – .eml
  • 1b778e81ee303688c32117c6663494616cec4db13d0dee7694031d77f0487f39 – .eml
  • 12e9b955d76fd0e769335da2487db2e273e9af55203af5421fc6220f3b1f695e – .eml
  • 12f138e5e511f9c75e14b76e0ee1f3c748e842dfb200ac1bfa43d81058a25a28 – .eml
  • 9dfbd57361c36d5e4bda9d442371fbaa6c32ae0e746ebaf59d4ec34d0c429221 – .docx (stage 1)
  • f1b58fd2bc8695effcabe8df9389eaa8c1f51cf4ec38737e4fbc777874b6e752 – .rtf (stage 2)
  • 5ad6cf87dd42622115f33b53523d0a659308abbbe3b48c7400cc51fd081bf4dd – .doc
  • 7db8d0ff64709d864102c7d29a3803a1099851642374a473e492a3bc2f2a7bae – .rtf
  • 01538c304e4ed77239fc4e31fb14c47604a768a7f9a2a0e7368693255b408420 – .rtf
  • d7ea3b7497f00eec39f8950a7f7cf7c340cf9bf0f8c404e9e677e7bf31ffe7be – .vbs
  • ccce59e6335c8cc6adf973406af1edb7dea5d8ded4a956984dff4ae587bcf0a8 – .exe (packed)
  • c73c58933a027725d42a38e92ad9fd3c9bbb1f8a23b3f97a0dd91e49c38a2a43 – .exe (unpacked)
Categories: Microsoft

P = NP: Cloud data protection in vulnerable non-production environments

Microsoft Malware Protection Center - Wed, 07/11/2018 - 11:00am

Data is the holy grail of your cloud workloads for attackers. Data breaches are the kind of breaches that make the news. With the recent European Union General Data Protection Regulations (GDPR), they will make even bigger headlines. From an enterprise point of view, the most challenging aspect of protecting data is knowing what it is and where it resides. Only when these two questions are answered can you drive data protection via organizational policies.

Most of your sensitive data is collected in production environmentsthe environments you know that you need to protect, and you usually do. But this is only part of the story. Even though best practices mandate that sensitive information be scrubbed before it transits in the organization, this cannot be ensured. It stands in contradiction to the growing adoption and improvements of the shift-left testing concept, as well as other business needs.

Shift-left testing is the movement of testing to earlier stages in the development lifecycle. Mature testing in early stages is appreciated as it helps developers find problems earlier and in a more cost-effective manner. It also helps quality assurance teams to reproduce bugs in the system and accelerates the debugging processes.

There are other business needs for pulling data to non-production environments. In the research and analytics space, data scientists and analysts prefer to use real data to do their research effectively, whether to offer models that improve the production systems, to perform forensic and log analysis, or to bring insight to product, strategy, and marketing teams, to name a few. In the customer service space, helpdesk personnel may need to pull sensitive records to allow them to perform their jobs efficiently.

For these purposes and others, production data is being pulled not only to the staging environment, but also to development and test environments, as well as research and analytics environments. Data may even reach personal or team playgrounds. Oftentimes, the reality is that organizations disperse data across various environments, making it hard to keep track of what and where.

The following schematic depicts the flow of code from development environments to staging and production environments, along with the flow of production data back to staging, development, and research environments to allow for mature testing and business improvement at earlier stages. The latter flow may even continue to leak outside the organizations IT.

From a security point of view, the data pull should be protected, and sensitive data should not be present in a non-production environment. Synthetic fake data generation should be applied when possible, and format-preserving masking should be applied when data needs to be more realistic. However, not using real data will always impose some loss of data properties and, in turn, the data will always lack some characteristics that may be crucial for testing, and certainly for research. Therefore, to enable advanced testing at earlier stages and allow for better analytics, real data will keep being pulled out of production environments, and the associated risk will be spread throughout the organizations data stores.

To address this risk, applying perimeter solutions is a good start. But if this is your answer to the risk, then you should think again! Are you sure that once an attacker gets a hold of your sensitive data, he cannot evade detection? Are you sure that you have no malicious insiders? What is a perimeter in the cloud?

Lets take a step back and rethink the basics of what is needed from a data protection solution: beyond basic security requirements, such as role-based access control, multifactor authentication, setting up firewalls, and encrypting data at rest and data in transit, advanced threat protection should be deployed. This comprises of:

  1. Visibility on where your sensitive data resides, what type of sensitive data it is, and who is accessing this data and how.
  2. Understanding the vulnerabilities of your data stores and being able to fix them.
  3. Detecting the threats and attempts made to infiltrate your data stores.

Any subset of these capabilities is going to leave weak spots in your organizations posture. For instance, if you have visibility regarding the whereabouts of sensitive data, but no knowledge of the vulnerabilities of your databases, can you be sure that any attempt to infiltrate/exfiltrate your database is detected? Test environments are commonly targeted for data breaches where real data is used for testing and development purposes, like the recent example of Shutterfly.

In addition, if you have a vulnerability in a non-production resource, most likely it exists in similar production resources as well. Finding this out gives a great deal of leverage in reconnaissance terms to attackers. They can probe and investigate non-production environments to find weak spots, then apply them to production environments, minimizing their contact with your production environments, and minimizing the probability of being caught by your threat detection solutionsin case the latter is only deployed on your production environments.

This establishes the following imperative: data protection must be an organization-wide solution, not only a production environment deployment! Hence, P = NP.

From a cloud workload protection perspective, you should build a vision of how to protect your data resources that considers your IT, DevOps, and research methodologies, as well as your data stewardship practices. Deriving a roadmap for this vision requires a solution that allows you to discover your organizations data resources, including any resources in your shadow IT infrastructure. The outcome of this methodic processwhether its manual, semi-automated, or fully automatedshould be a mapping of your data estate across all sorts of environments and an associated risk statement with each resource. This evaluation gives you a metric and can be used as a compass to secure your organization. The resources that were deemed eligible for advanced security should then be continuously monitored with advanced threat prevention solutions that keep you alerted with the vulnerabilities of your resources, the sensitivity of your data, and a real-time threat detection capability. Therefore, when we are asked by customers whether they should protect their non-production environments, our answer is: P = NP!

Azure Security Center is a great built-in tool with Azure that can help you protect all your environments. It helps you assess the security state of your cloud resources, both production and non-production environments and provides advanced threat protection against evolving threats. You can start a free trial for Azure and the Security Center, or if youre already using Azure, just open the Security Center blade to start using it today.

Categories: Microsoft

Assessing Microsoft 365 security solutions using the NIST Cybersecurity Framework

Microsoft Malware Protection Center - Mon, 07/02/2018 - 3:00pm

This blog is part of a series that responds to common questions we receive from customers about deployment of Microsoft 365 security solutions. In this series, youll find context, answers, and guidance for deployment and driving adoption within your organization. Check out our last blogNew FastTrack benefit: Deployment support for Co-management on Windows 10 devices.

Microsoft 365 security solutions align to many cybersecurity protection standards. One widely-adopted standard is the National Institute of Standards and Technology Cybersecurity Framework (NIST CSF). Developed for the US government, NIST CSF is now also used by governments and enterprises worldwide as a best practice for managing cybersecurity risk. Mapping your Microsoft 365 security solutions to NIST CSF can also help you achieve compliance with many certifications and regulations, such as FedRAMP, and others.

Microsoft 365 security solutions are designed to help you empower your users to do their best work securely, from anywhere and with the tools they love. Our security philosophy is built on four pillars: identity and access management, threat protection, information protection, and security management. Microsoft 365 E5 (see Figure 1.) includes products for each pillar that work together to keep your organization safe.

Figure 1.The Microsoft 365 security solutions

At the heart of NIST CSF is the Cybersecurity Framework Core a set of Functions and related outcomes for improving cybersecurity (see Figure 2). In this blog, well show you examples of how you can assess Microsoft 365 security capabilities using the four Function areas in the core: Identify, Protect, Detect and Respond.* Well also provide practical tips on how you can use Microsoft 365 Security to help achieve key outcomes within each function.

Figure 2.The NIST Cybersecurity Framework Core

Identify Develop the organizational understanding to manage cybersecurity risk to systems, assets, data, and capabilities.

The purpose of this function is to gain a better understanding of your IT environment and identify exactly which assets are at risk of attack. From there, you can start to align these assets and associated risks to your overall business goals (including regulatory and industry requirements) and prioritize which assets require attention.

For example, the Asset management category is about identifying and managing the data, personnel, devices, and systems that enable an organization to achieve its business purpose in a way that is consistent with their relative importance to business objectives and the organizations risk strategy.

Microsoft 365 security solutions help identify and manage key assets such as user identity, company data, PCs and mobile devices, and cloud apps used by company employees. First, provisioning user identities in Microsoft Azure Active Directory (AD) provides fundamental asset and user identity management that includes application access, single sign-on, and device management. Through Azure AD Connect, you can integrate your on-premises directories with Azure Active Directory. (See Figure 3.) This capability allows for a common secure identity for users of Microsoft Office 365, Azure, and thousands of other Software as a Service (SaaS) applications pre-integrated into Azure AD.

Figure 3.Through Azure AD Connect, you can integrate your on-premises directories with Azure Active Directory

Deployment Tip:Start by managing identities in the cloud with Azure AD to get the benefit of single sign-on for all your employees. Azure AD Connect will help you integrate your on-premises directories with Azure Active Directory.

Protect Develop and implement the appropriate safeguards to ensure delivery of critical infrastructure services.

The Protect function focuses on policies and procedures to protect data from a potential cybersecurity attack.

Microsoft 365 security solutions support NIST CSF related categories in this function. For example, the Identity management and access control category is about managing access to assets by limiting authorization to devices, activities, and transactions. Your first safeguard against threats or attackers is to maintain strict, reliable, and appropriate access control. Azure Active Directory Conditional Access evaluates a set of configurable conditions, including user, device, application, and risk (see Figure 4.) Based on these conditions, you can then set the right level of access control. For access control on your networks.

Figure 4. Azure AD Conditional Access evaluates a set of configurable conditions, including user, device, application, and risk

Deployment Tip:Manage access control by configuring conditional access policies in Azure AD. Use conditional access to apply conditions that grant access depending on a range of factors or conditions, such as location, device compliance, and employee need.

Detect Develop and implement the appropriate activities to identify the occurrence of a cybersecurity event.

The Detect function covers systems and procedures that help you monitor your environment and detect a security breach as quickly as possible.

Microsoft 365 security solutions provide you with solutions that detect and protect against Anomalies and events in real time. Microsoft 365 security solutions offer advanced threat protection (see Figure 5.), security and audit log management, and application whitelisting to ensure the security and resilience of systems and assets, consistent with related policies, procedures, and agreements. Microsoft 365 has capabilities to detect attacks across these three key attack vectors:

  • Device-based attacksWindows Defender Advanced Threat Protection provides near-instant detection and blocking of new and emerging threats using advanced file and process behavior monitoring and other heuristics. The Alerts queue shows a list of alerts that are flagged from machines in your network.
  • Email-based attacksOffice 365 Advanced Threat Protection protects your emails, attachments, online storage, files, and environment through a variety of technology, including Safe Attachments, Exchange Online Protection, and rich reporting and tracking insights
  • Identity credential attacksAzure Advanced Threat Protection Azure ATP takes information from logs and network events to learn the behavior of users in the organization and build a behavioral profile about them. Then it detects suspicious activities, searching for malicious attacks, abnormal behavior, and security issues and risks.

Figure 5.Threat detection integrated across Microsoft 365

Respond Response processes and procedures are executed and maintained to ensure timely response to detected cybersecurity events

The Respond Function provides guidelines for effectively containing a cybersecurity incident once it has occurred through development and execution of an effective incident response plan.

Microsoft 365 security solutions directly support the Response Planning category based on a variety of visibility reports and insights. Azure AD Access and Usage reports allow you to view and assess the integrity and security of your organizations implementation of Azure AD. With this information, you can better determine where possible security risks may lie and adequately plan to mitigate those risks. These reports are also used for event Mitigation including anomaly reports, integrated application reports, error reports, user-specific reports, and activity logs that contain a record of all audited events within the last 24 hours, last 7 days, or last 30 days. Supporting the Analysis category, Microsoft offers guidance and education on Windows security and forensics to give organizations the ability to investigate cybercriminal activity and more effectively respond and recover from malware incidents.

Want to Learn More?

For more information and guidance on assessing Microsoft 365 security solutions using the NIST CSF, check out the whitepaper.

Deployment Tip:For more help with Microsoft 365 security, consider FastTrack for Microsoft 365. Whether youre planning your initial Microsoft 365 Security rollout, need to onboard your product, or want to drive end user adoption, FastTrack is your benefit service and is ready to assist you. Get started at FastTrack for Microsoft 365.

* Although Microsoft offers customers some guidance and tools to help with certain the fifth Recover function (data backup, account recovery), Microsoft 365 doesnt specifically address this function. Note also that Microsoft isnt endorsing this NIST framework – there are other standards for cybersecurity protection – but we find it helpful to baseline against commonly used scenarios.

More blog posts from this series:

Categories: Microsoft

Perspectives of a former CISO: Disrupted security in digitalization

Microsoft Malware Protection Center - Mon, 07/02/2018 - 12:00pm

My passion is the connection of security to the business objectives, and it has been a part of my work with many CISOs across industries as well as my experience as a CISO. This blog series a compilation of my learnings as a CISO, as well as learnings from peers and customers who are actively working to figure out how to best align security organizations with their business. This first blog will cover why it is so critical for a security organization to shake off the total compliance mindset and be balanced with a focus closely on aligning to the business of the organization with a clear risk-based approach.

It is not news that the world changed in the last two decades through digital transformation and the requirements for security have also. Initially, it was mainly focused on protecting the network and building virtual walls around the digital assets of a company. The fast evolution of mobile technology, globalization, and digitalization has disrupted standard assumptions for business and they are transforming to adapt, and security needs to be in lock step or better yet – to lead this journey. The world is not what it used to be as it looks more like the graphic image below:

Security must be closely aligned to the business it serves and protects against attacks by the criminal groups working on the Internet. Crime went digital from vandalism to classical crime to nation states. The business, on the other hand, gets disrupted and must change at a speed never seen before. This is the place, where security needs to be.

Security must enable the business transformation and ensure acceptable business risks. This is a non-negotiable truth as securitys sole purpose of existence is to protect the organization that employs it. This is more difficult than it sounds because security started as a purely technical discipline with a common belief that success was achieved in compliance with standards. Many organizations are on the journey of shifting this mindset to a risk-based approach and a deep alignment with their business counterparts. This is a major shift for the security organization as it requires major cultural changes, different priorities, changing of processes and habits, as well as technology changes. I have seen a lot of security people hiding behind their policies instead of helping the business to be successful. This is not solving any problems in todays world.

Regardless of your industry, compliance does not bring security good security brings compliance. Success in security is all about running a reasonable risk management and risk mitigation program, which is leveraged and often even driven by the business leaders, and which clears the way for the business to be successful in a frequently hostile environment.

Chief Security Officers must re-think what they do, re-think the way they look at the world and constantly try to disrupt themselves. I recognize that this is something people in security are typically not good at, as most of us had been taught risk avoidance during our careers (sound familiar?).

Disruptive changes require going against this nature and taking risks where the outcome is uncertain. While this is uncomfortable, it is critically important for our future success.

Looking at it from a more outward view, the CSO has different constituencies to satisfy:

  • Top-Management: The top management wants to understand their key cyber risks, what they need to do with them and whether they invest the right amount in the right location. Key risk means comparable to the other business risks they must deal with. CSOs need to keep this in mind: The CEO has a lot of business risks on his/her table and the Cyber risks have to be aligned with them. Typically as a rule of thumb we might speak of 5-8 risks, where the CSO needs to see action and support by the CEO and the board.
  • Employees: Looking at the employees, security needs to enable them to run their business successfully and with acceptable risks. It is not about security or productivity, we talk of security AND productivity.
  • Customers/partners: Obviously, customers and partners have a certain expectation about what the supplier does with their data and how they protect them. This is not only compliance to data protection regulations, but gaining trust.
  • Regulator: Regulators are heavily challenged by todays situation. Rules which were valid a few years ago, do not apply anymore. New definitions of sovereignty need to be developed. Modern technologies suddenly change the rules of the game as it was known. Most regulators need help and they want to listen to the industry if the discussion happens with mutual respect.
  • Security Community: The security community is often ignored by companies, which can lead to rather dramatic security challenges. Think about what happens if somebody finds a vulnerability in an infrastructure and wants to responsibly disclose this vulnerability to the security organization. How do they find the right people and process? How are they dealt with?

Security needs to be re-thought and certain base assumptions need to be disrupted and re-thought. Progressing digitalization, as well as emerging technologies, will challenge the thoughts again and security functions will be constantly forced to look for new and creative ways to support the business. Our stakeholders are moving fast and so must we. We need to get more in a DevOps approach and align closely with the fast-moving criminal landscape, the fast-moving technology, and the fast-moving business.

For more information
Categories: Microsoft

Taking apart a double zero-day sample discovered in joint hunt with ESET

Microsoft Malware Protection Center - Mon, 07/02/2018 - 11:00am

In late March 2018, I analyzed an interesting PDF sample found by ESET senior malware researcher Anton Cherpanov. The sample was initially reported to Microsoft as a potential exploit for an unknown Windows kernel vulnerability. During my investigation in parallel with ESET researchers, I was surprised to discover two new zero-day exploits in the same PDF. One exploit affected Adobe Acrobat and Reader, while the other exploit affected older platforms, Windows 7 and Windows Server 2008. Microsoft and Adobe have since released corresponding security updates:

The first exploit attacks the Adobe JavaScript engine to run shellcode in the context of that module. The second exploit, which does not affect modern platforms like Windows 10, allows the shellcode to escape Adobe Reader sandbox and run with elevated privileges from Windows kernel memory. ESET provided an analysis of the exploitation routines in the sample PDF.

Although the PDF sample was found in VirusTotal, we have not observed actual attacks perpetrated using these exploits. The exploit was in early development stage, given the fact that the PDF itself did not deliver a malicious payload and appeared to be proof-of-concept (PoC) code.

Finding and neutralizing a double zero-day exploit before an attacker had a chance to use it was an amazing result of the great collaboration between ESET, Microsoft, and Adobe security researchers.

Heres some more information about the exploit process. This analysis is based on a sample we found after additional hunting (SHA-256: 4b672deae5c1231ea20ea70b0bf091164ef0b939e2cf4d142d31916a169e8e01).

Exploit overview

The Adobe Acrobat and Reader exploit is incorporated in a PDF document as a malicious JPEG 2000 stream containing the JavaScript exploit code. The following diagram provides an overview of the exploit process.

Figure 1. Overview of the exploit process

As shown in the diagram, the exploit process takes place in several stages:

  1. JavaScript lays out heap spray memory.
  2. Malicious JPEG 2000 stream triggers an out-of-bounds access operation.
  3. The access operation is called upon out-of-bounds memory laid out by the heap spray.
  4. The access operation corrupts the virtual function table (vftable).
  5. The corrupted vftable transfers execution to a return-oriented programming (ROP) chain.
  6. The ROP chain transfers execution to the main shellcode.
  7. The main elevation-of-privilege (EoP) module loads through reflective DLL loading.
  8. The main PE module launches the loaded Win32k EoP exploit.
  9. When the EoP exploit succeeds, it drops a .vbs file in the Startup folder. The .vbs file appears to be proof-of-concept malware designed to download additional payloads.
Malicious JPEG 2000 stream

The malicious JPEG 2000 stream is embedded with the following malicious tags.

Figure 2. Malicious JPEG 2000 stream

The following image shows the CMAP and PCLR tags with malicious values. The length of CMAP array (0xfd) is smaller than the index value (0xff) referenced in PCLR tagsthis results in the exploitation of the out-of-bounds memory free vulnerability.

Figure 3. Out-of-bounds index of CMAP array

Combined with heap-spray technique used in the JavaScript, the out-of-bounds exploit leads to corruption of the vftable.

Figure 4. vftable corruption with ROP chain to code execution

The shellcode and portable executable (PE) module is encoded in JavaScript.

Figure 5 Shellcode in JavaScript

Reflective DLL loading

The shellcode (pseudocode shown below) loads the main PE module through reflective DLL loading, a common technique seen in advanced attacks to attempt staying undetected in memory. On Windows 10, the reflective DLL loading technique is exposed by Windows Defender Advanced Threat Protection (Windows Defender ATP).

The shellcode searches for the start of the PE record and parses PE sections, copying them to the newly allocated memory area. It then passes control to an entry point in the PE module.

Figure 6. Copying PE sections to allocated memory

Figure 7. Passing control to an entry point in the loaded DLL

Main Win32k EoP exploit

The main Win32k elevation-of-privilege (EoP) exploit runs from the loaded PE module. It appears to target machines running Windows 7 SP1 and takes advantage of the previously unreported CVE-2018-8120 vulnerability, which is not present on Windows 10 and newer products. The exploit uses a NULL page to pass malicious records and copy arbitrary data to an arbitrary kernel location. The NULL page dereference exploitation technique is also mitigated by default for x64 platforms running Windows 8 or later.

Figure 8. EoP exploit flow

Heres how the main exploit proceeds:

  1. The exploit calls NtAllocateVirtualMemory following sgdt instructions to allocate a fake data structure at the NULL page.
  2. It passes a malformed MEINFOEX structure to the SetImeInfoEx Win32k kernel function.
  3. SetImeInfoEx picks up the fake data structure allocated at the NULL page.
  4. The exploit uses the fake data structure to copy malicious instructions to +0x1a0 on the Global Descriptor Table (GDT).
  5. It calls an FWORD instruction to call into the fake GDT entry instructions.
  6. The exploit successfully calls instructions in the fake GDT entry.
  7. The instructions run shellcode allocated in user mode from kernel mode memory space.
  8. The exploit modifies the EPROCESS.Token of the shellcode process to grant SYSTEM privileges.

On Windows 10, the EPROCESS.Token modification behavior would be surfaced by Windows Defender ATP.

The malformed IMEINFOEX structure in combination with fake data at the NULL page triggers corruption of the GDT entry as shown below.

Figure 9. Corrupted GDT entry

The corrupted GDT has actual instructions that run through call gate through a call FWORD instruction.

Figure 10. Patched GDT entry instructions

After returning from these instructions, the extended instruction pointer (EIP) returns to the caller code in user space with kernel privileges. The succeeding code elevates privileges of the current process by modifying the process token to SYSTEM.

Figure 11. Replacing process token pointer

Persistence

After privilege escalation, the exploit code drops the .vbs, a proof-of-concept malware, into the local Startup folder.

Figure 12. Code that drops the .vbs file to the Startup folder

Recommended defenses

To protect against attacks leveraging the exploits found in the PDF:

While we have not seen attacks distributing the PDF, Office 365 Advanced Threat Protection (Office 365 ATP) would block emails that carry malformed PDF and other malicious attachments. Office 365 ATP uses a robust detonation platform, heuristics, and machine learning to inspect attachments and links for malicious content in real-time.

Windows 10 users are not impacted by the dual exploits, thanks to platform hardening and exploit mitigations. For attacks against Windows 10, Windows Defender Advanced Threat Protection (Windows Defender ATP) would surface kernel attacks with similar exploitation techniques that use process token modification to elevate privileges, as shown below (sample process privilege escalation alert).

Figure 13. Sample Windows Defender ATP alert for process token modification

With Advanced hunting in Windows Defender ATP, customers can hunt for related exploit activity using the following query we added to the Github repository:

Figure 14. Advanced hunting query

Windows Defender ATP provides complete endpoint protection platform (EPP) and endpoint detection response (EDR) solutions for Windows 10, Windows Server 2012, Windows Server 2012 R2, and Windows Server 2016. Additional support for devices running Windows 7 and Windows 8.1 is currently in preview. Additionally, Windows Defender ATP can surface threats on macOS, Linux, and Android devices via security partners.

Windows Defender ATP integrates with other technologies in Windows, Office 365, and Enterprise Mobility + Security platforms to automatically update protection and detection and orchestrate remediation across Microsoft 365.

To experience the power of Windows Defender ATP for yourself, sign up for a free trial now.

Indicators of compromise

SHA-256: dd4e4492fecb2f3fe2553e2bcedd44d17ba9bfbd6b8182369f615ae0bd520933
SHA-1: 297aef049b8c6255f4461affdcfc70e2177a71a9
File type: PE
Description: Win32k exploit

SHA-256: 4b672deae5c1231ea20ea70b0bf091164ef0b939e2cf4d142d31916a169e8e01
SHA-1: 0d3f335ccca4575593054446f5f219eba6cd93fe
File type: PDF
Description: Test exploit

SHA-256: 0608c0d26bdf38e064ab3a4c5c66ff94e4907ccaf98281a104fd99175cdf54a8
SHA-1: c82cfead292eeca601d3cf82c8c5340cb579d1c6
File type: PDF
Description: PDF exploit testing sample (Win32k part missing)

SHA-256: d2b7065f7604039d70ec393b4c84751b48902fe33d021886a3a96805cede6475
SHA-1: edeb1de93dce5bb84752276074a57937d86f2cf7
File type: JavaScript
Description: JavaScript embedded in 0608c0d26bdf38e064ab3a4c5c66ff94e4907ccaf98281a104fd99175cdf54a8

 

 

Matt Oh
Windows Defender ATP Research

 

 

 

 

Talk to us

Questions, concerns, or insights on this story? Join discussions at the Microsoft community and Windows Defender Security Intelligence.

Follow us on Twitter @WDSecurity and Facebook Windows Defender Security Intelligence.

SHA-256: dd4e4492fecb2f3fe2553e2bcedd44d17ba9bfbd6b8182369f615ae0bd520933
SHA-1: 297aef049b8c6255f4461affdcfc70e2177a71a9
File type: PE
Description: Win32k exploit

SHA-256: 4b672deae5c1231ea20ea70b0bf091164ef0b939e2cf4d142d31916a169e8e01
SHA-1: 0d3f335ccca4575593054446f5f219eba6cd93fe
File type: PDF
Description: Test exploit

SHA-256: 0608c0d26bdf38e064ab3a4c5c66ff94e4907ccaf98281a104fd99175cdf54a8
SHA-1: c82cfead292eeca601d3cf82c8c5340cb579d1c6
File type: PDF
Description: PDF exploit testing sample (Win32k part missing)

SHA-256: d2b7065f7604039d70ec393b4c84751b48902fe33d021886a3a96805cede6475
SHA-1: edeb1de93dce5bb84752276074a57937d86f2cf7
File type: JavaScript
Description: JavaScript embedded in 0608c0d26bdf38e064ab3a4c5c66ff94e4907ccaf98281a104fd99175cdf54a8

Categories: Microsoft

The need and opportunity for adaptive prevention in the cloud

Microsoft Malware Protection Center - Tue, 06/26/2018 - 12:00pm

This post is authored by Michael Bargury, Data Scientist, C+E Security.

The need

The cloud introduces new security challenges, which differ from classic ones by diversity and scale. Once a Virtual Machine (VM) is up and running with an open internet port, it is almost instantaneously subject to vulnerability scanning and Brute Force (BF) attacks. These attacks are usually not directed at a specific organizations environment. Instead, they cover a broad range of environments, hoping to infiltrate even a small fraction of them, to be used for their computational power or as part of a botnet.

The agile nature of the cloud allows organizations to build elaborate and highly customized environments. These environments constantly change, as customers utilize the clouds ability to adapt to variations in computational or network communication demands. Although this agility is one of the clouds top offerings, it also makes it harder to apply and maintain security best practices. As your environment changes, the security measurements needed to protect it might change as well. Moreover, while security experts can manually analyze common environment scenarios and offer security recommendations, the huge diversity in the cloud renders these recommendations useless for many organizations, which requires more tailor-suited solutions.

Proper security recommendations have the potential to make a huge impact on an organizations security. They can minimize attack surface, essentially blocking attacks before they occur.

The opportunity

On the other hand, the cloud provides unique opportunities, which are impossible or impractical for most organizations on their own. The broad visibility and the diversity of environments allow statistical models to detect abnormal activities across the cloud. Organizations can anonymously share their security-related data with trusted 3rd parties such as Azure Security Center (ASC), which can leverage this data to provide better detection and security recommendations for all organizations. Essentially, the cloud allows organizations to combine their knowledge in a way, which is much larger than the sum of its parts.

Leveraging these cloud-unique opportunities gives birth to a whole new world of customized security recommendations. Instead of a single one-fits-all best practice, the cloud allows customized best practices to be generated and updated constantly, as a cloud environment is built and evolved. Imagine an agent, which detects a security risk associated with a machine placed under the wrong subnet, or an automatically updating firewall.

Example

Let us dive into a very basic, yet typical scenario. As a developer in a cloud-based organization, I would like to deploy a new SQL-Server on Windows. I deploy a new Windows VM, install SQL-Server and create an inbound rule in my Network Security Group (NSG) to allow for incoming communication in port 1433.

A few months later, the SQL-Server had long been deleted. The VM is being used for something else entirely. The only thing left from my initial deployment is the inbound rule on port 1433, which has been forgotten by the individual who deleted the SQL-Server. This leaves an opening for malicious intenders to gain access to my machine, or simply to cause an overuse of resources by bombarding it with requests. After a while, I get a security alert from ASC. There was a successful BF attack on my machine, and it is now compromised. Looking at the logs, I see that the attack was carried through port 1433.

A good security recommender system would have identified that port 1433 is no longer in use by SQL Server, and prompt me with a recommendation to close it before the machine was compromised.

Learning scenario

Taking the perspective of a cloud provider, we will now devise a way to detect the scenario mentioned above and recommend a mitigation on time.

We can safely assume that most Azure customers use port 1433 for SQL-Server communication, as it is the default port used in SQL-Server software. This reduces our problem to the following goal: find machines with an inbound rule for port 1433, which do not run SQL-Server software.

But wait, how do we know which SQL-Server software to look for the absence of? We can try to manually devise a list of executables with underline SQL-Server, but there must be a better way.

Remember, we have assumed that most Azure customers use port 1433 for SQL-Server communication. Utilizing this assumption, we can learn which executable is unusually common in machines with an inbound rule on port 1433, out of the entire population of Azure VMs.

And so, our final goal becomes: find machines with an inbound rule for port 1433, which do not run common executables within this group.

We can try to reach this goal in several ways. We can take a classification approach. We use two weeks of executable executions, from 30K Azure machines that use ASCs monitoring agent.

First, we devise a list of distinct executables. We are looking for executables of a very common software so we can filter the list by executables that run in more than 10 Azure VMs, to reduce noise. This leaves us with 4,361 distinct executables.

We represent each Azure VM as a vector of indicators of executables run by that VM. For example, consider A, which ran only a single executable. That VM would be represented by zero-vector, with a single coordinate containing a one, which represents that executable. Next, we label each VM by whether or not it has port 1433 open for inbound traffic.

We will treat our dataset as a classification problem: given a binary feature vector for each VM, predict whether its port 1433 is open for inbound traffic. Notice that we already know the answer to this question. Therefore, we will be able to measure the accuracy of our model.

We train a Random Forest (RF) model to solve the classification problem. We use an RF for multiple reasons. First, it forces the model to only consider a small subset of features, which corresponds to a small number of executables which we hope would be SQL-Server related. Second, allowing only a few trees in the RF will yield a simple classification model, easily interpretable and understandable.

To avoid overfitting, we use hypothesis validation. We split our dataset 70-30 percent to train-test dataset. We train the model on the training set and measure its performance on the test set.

// Error = (# wrong classifications) / (# samples) Train error = 0.00095 Test error = 0.00128

The model performs very well, with low classification error both for the train and test sets.

Lets think about what happened here. The model was able to accurately predict whether a VM has an inbound rule for port 1433, using a small list of executables ran by that VM. This implies that there is some set of executables, which are extremely common among VMs which can be addressed on port 1433. To examine these executables, we can look at the top ten features by importance (significance to classification) provided by our classifier:

  1. \\program files\\microsoft sql server\\mssql_ver.mssqlserver\\mssql\\binn\\sqlagent.exe
  2. \\program files\\microsoft sql server iaas agent\\bin\\ma\\agentcore.exe
  3. \\packages\\plugins\\microsoft.compute.vmaccessagent\\version\\bin\\jsonvmaccessextension.exe
  4. \\program files\\microsoft sql server iaas agent\\bin\\sqlservice.exe
  5. \\program files\\microsoft sql server\\mssqlmssqlserver\\mssql\\binn\\databasemail.exe
  6. \\windows\\microsoft.net\\framework\\version\\ngen.exe
  7. \\program files (x86)\\microsoft sql server\\version\\tools\\binn\\sqlexe
  8. \\packages\\plugins\\microsoft.sqlmanagement.sqliaasagent\\version\\sqliaasextensiondeployer.exe
  9. \\packages\\plugins\\microsoft.enterprisecloud.monitoring.microsoftmonitoringagent\\version\\mmaextensionheartbeatservice.exe
  10. \\program files\\microsoft sql server\\mssqlmssqlserver\\mssql\\binn\\fdhost.exe

This is excellent. Our model found that the best indicators for port 1433 being open, is having SQL-Server related executables running on the VM. This validates our assumption that most Azure customers use port 1433 for SQL-Server communication! Otherwise, our model wasnt able to get such high accuracy scores by using SQL-Server executables as features.

Returning to our initial goal we are looking for machines which do not run executables which are very common within this group. For these machines, there is no way the model can detect that their port 1433 is open, judging from SQL-Server related executables. Hence, these machines should correspond with our models classification errors! More specifically, we are looking for false negatives (FN, the model wrongly classifies the VM to have a closed port 1433).

Let’s examine one of these VMs. Here is its list of ran executables:

  1. \windows\softwaredistribution\download\install\: [exe, windows-ver-delta.exe]
  2. \windowsazure\guestagent_ver\collectguestlogs.exe
  3. \program files\microsoft security client\mpcmdrun.exe
  4. \windows\servicing\trustedinstaller.exe
  5. \windows\winsxs\amd64_microsoft-windows-servicingstack_ver\tiworker.exe
  6. \program files\microsoft office 15\clientx64\officec2rclient.exe
  7. \program files\java\: [jre_ver\bin\jp2launcher.exe, 8.0_144\bin\javaws.exe]
  8. \program files (x86)\common files\java\java update\jucheck.exe
  9. \windows\microsoft.net\framework64\ver\: [exe, ngen.exe]
  10. \windows\microsoft.net\framework\ver\: [exe, ngentask.exe]
  11. \windows\system32\inetsrv\w3wp.exe
  12. \windows\system32\wbem\: [exe, wmiprvse.exe]
  13. \windows\system32\: [taskhostex.exe, mrt.exe, schtasks.exe, taskeng.exe, wsqmcons.exe, rundll32.exe, sc.exe, lpremove.exe, mpsigstub.exe, ceipdata.exe, defrag.exe, sppsvc.exe, cmd.exe, conhost.exe, svchost.exe, aitagent.exe, taskhost.exe, mrt-ver.exe, sppextcomobj.exe, wermgr.exe, werfault.exe, tzsync.exe, slui.exe]

Indeed,we dont see SQL-Server here! Actually, it seems like this VM is running mostly Windows/Azure updates. We can issue a recommendation for this VM to remove its inbound rule for port 1433. Looking at past ASC alerts, we can see that this machine was brute forced on six different days, providing valuable attack surface to malicious intenders. Our model can put an end to that!

Overall, we found five machines which might have port 1433 open for no reason (FN of the classification model).

Generalization

Now that we have a working model and a nice Proof of Concept, we might consider applying it for similar scenarios. After all, why focus only on port 1433 and SQL-Server, when our model didnt depend on either of these as an assumption.

We can generalize our scenario and solution to the following:

  • Goal: find machines with an inbound rule for port X, which do not run executables which are very common within this group.
  • Method: Train an RF to predict whether or not a machine has port X open for inbound traffic, based on the executables ran. Output the machine that was misclassified by the RF.
Conclusions

The scenario developed above is only the tip on the iceberg. The Azure Security Center (ASC) team is working hard on providing adaptive prevention capabilities, to enable better security for Azure customers. For information about the first adaptive prevention feature in ASC, see How Azure Security Center uses machine learning to enable adaptive application control. To learn about the use of Machine Learning in ASC, see Machine Learning in Azure Security Center.

Categories: Microsoft

Driving data security is a shared responsibility, here’s how you can protect yourself

Microsoft Malware Protection Center - Tue, 06/19/2018 - 12:00pm

You’re driving a long, dark road on a rainy night. If you’re driving 20 miles over the speed limit and you don’t step on the brakes when the car in front of you comes to a sudden stop, is it your fault or your car manufacturers fault if you rear-end the car that is in front of you?

When we drive, we seamlessly understand that there are some things we depend on the manufacturer to provide (brakes that work, airbags that deploy) and some things we’re responsible for (using the brakes when needed, not turning off the airbag protection).

This is the concept of shared responsibility and was a core topic at this years Cybersecurity Law Institute panel Vendors and Cloud-Based Solutions: How Can All Stakeholders Protect Themselves?

When it comes to cloud computing and data protection, it is a shared responsibility between the cloud service provider (CSP) and the customer that is analogous to the relationship between the car owner and car manufacturer.

While the fundamentals of shared responsibility between drivers and car manufacturers seem relatively straightforward, its not always as clear-cut when analyzing the responsibilities between customers and CSPs for protecting cloud data.

The cloud, as a relatively new architectural model for many organizations, is unique because there are multiple organic models that can shift responsibilities between customers and CSPs. For example, customers can only configure the application layer software in Software as a Service (SaaS) applications. But when moving down the stack to Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS), customers have the responsibility for configuring and managing the servers theyve stood up in the cloud.

While on the Georgetown Law Institute panel in D.C., I explained how Microsoft views the shared responsibility model as a working partnership with customers to ensure they are clear on what we provide and what their responsibilities are across the stack. To be sure, there are some perceptible shifts in responsibility, which is illustrated in the graphic below.

The left-most column shows seven responsibilities that customers should consider when using different cloud service models. The model shows how customers are responsible for ensuring that data and its classification is done correctly and that the solution is compliant with regulatory obligations. Physical security falls to the CSP, and the rest of the responsibilities are shared. Note this a general rule of thumb, and every customer should talk to its CSP to ensure and understand the responsibilities are outlined and meet the organizational needs.

Once a customer has a solid handle on what the CSP is providing, consider the three tips below for managing the shared responsibilities. These could include things like network controls, host infrastructure, end-point protection, application level controls, and access management.

Consult the STARs

The CSA STAR registry consists of three levels of assurance, which cover four unique offerings based on a comprehensive list of cloud control objectives. Here customers can see what controls a provider has attested to. STAR also helps customers assess how different providers are using a harmonized model. Its also important to ask the CSP if it has completed a SOC 2 Type 2. This assessment is based on a mature attest standard, and ensure that evaluation takes place over time rather than at a point in time, among other helpful standards.

(Really!) Read the contracts

Yes, it’s tempting to skip over the long legalese, but the nuances of a contract between a customer and CSP can go a long way in helping each side understand its shared responsibilities. For example, if the contract allows for certain levels of transparency between the two in the form of allowing the customer to see an audit or compliance report. However, you should remember that seeing an overview isnt the same as being able to read every page of the report. A customer should know what level of transparency they’re getting. Customers should be certain there are clear roles and escalation paths that make sense, so if something goes wrong or a decision needs to be made about shutting off a service or reporting a breach, it can be done without hesitation. And don’t forget to engage your own counsel during contact review, no one understands legalese as well as a lawyer.

Follow the guides

To help organizations understand ways to protect their data in the cloud, Microsoft has blueprint guides for use cases like FFIEC and HIPAA regulations. We also have tools to help companies manage and improve their cloud controls, including Compliance manager and Secure score. Compliance manager enables organizations to manage their compliance activities from one place. Secure score is an assessment tool designed to make it easier for organizations to understand their security position in relation to other organizations while also providing advice on what controls they should consider enabling.

Microsoft takes its side of the shared responsibility model seriously and is continually looking for ways to help the customer identify weaknesses and put action plans in place to shore them up. Not unlike how car manufacturers continually iterate to make cars safer, safety enhancements are meant to lessen the burden of driver responsibilities, not remove them entirely. When it comes to protecting data, if you keep your eyes on your data road, well make sure the brakes are working.

For more information on shared responsibilities for cloud computing read this comprehensive white paper.

Categories: Microsoft

New FastTrack benefit: Deployment support for Co-management on Windows 10 devices

Microsoft Malware Protection Center - Mon, 06/18/2018 - 12:00pm

This blog is part of a series that responds to common questions we receive from customers about deployment of Microsoft 365 security solutions. In this series youll find context, answers, and guidance for deployment and driving adoption within your organization. Check out our last blog Getting the most value out of your security deployment.

We are pleased to announce that FastTrack for Microsoft 365 (a benefit of your Microsoft 365 subscription for planning, deployment and adoption), now provides deployment support for Co-management on your Windows 10 devices. Id like to provide a few highlights on what you can expect.

What is Co-management?

Co-management is the integration between Configuration Manager and Microsoft Intune that enables a Windows 10 device to be managed by Configuration Manager and Intune at the same time. This provides you with an opportunity to enable remote actions that can be taken on the device, like remote factory reset or selective wipe for lost or stolen devices. Some additional advantages include conditional access, enabling you to ensure devices accessing your corporate network are compliant with your company policies and requirements. And, with your Windows 10 device you have Windows AutoPilot which is automatic enrollment that enrolls devices in Intune. This can let you lower your provisioning costs on new Windows 10 devices from the cloud. Co-management empowers you to complement Configuration Manager with Intune and more easily bring all this together where cloud makes sense for your organization as seen in Figure 1 below.

Figure 1: Co-management architecture

What can you expect

As part of our deployment support, the FastTrack team will provide guidance on the following activities:

  • Enabling Active Directory auto enrollment
  • Enabling hybrid Azure Active Directory
  • Enabling the Cloud Management Gateway
  • Enabling Co-management in Configuration Manager
  • Switch over supported device management capabilities from Configuration Manager to Intune:
    • Device conditional access policies
    • Resource Access profiles
    • Windows Update for Business policies
    • EndPoint Protection policies
  • Setting up Intune to deploy the Configuration Manager agent to new devices
FastTrack for Microsoft 365 benefits

FastTrack continues to invest in bringing you end to end services for planning, onboarding and driving adoption of your eligible subscriptions, and comes at no additional charge. It is our commitment to help you to realize the value of your Microsoft 365 investment with a faster deployment and time to value.

FastTrack lets you engage with our FastTrack specialists and provides best practices, tools and resources to help you quickly and easily enable Microsoft 365 in your environment, now including co-management for Windows 10 devices.

Get started

To request assistance from FastTrack, you can get started by going to our FastTrack website. Click on the Sign In prompt, and enter your company or school ID. Go to the dashboard, and from there follow the prompts to access the Request for Assistance form. Your submission will be reviewed and routed to the appropriate team that will address your specific needs and eligibility.

The FastTrack website also provides you with best practices, tools, and resources from the experts to help make your deployment experience with the Microsoft Cloud a great one.

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Categories: Microsoft