Krebs

GovPayNow.com Leaks 14M+ Records

KrebsOnSecurity - Mon, 09/17/2018 - 5:57pm

Government Payment Service Inc. — a company used by thousands of U.S. state and local governments to accept online payments for everything from traffic citations and licensing fees to bail payments and court-ordered fines — has leaked more than 14 million customer records dating back at least six years, including names, addresses, phone numbers and the last four digits of the payer’s credit card.

Indianapolis-based GovPayNet, doing business online as GovPayNow.com, serves approximately 2,300 government agencies in 35 states. GovPayNow.com displays an online receipt when citizens use it to settle state and local government fees and fines via the site. Until this past weekend it was possible to view millions of customer records simply by altering digits in the Web address displayed by each receipt.

On Friday, Sept. 14, KrebsOnSecurity alerted GovPayNet that its site was exposing at least 14 million customer receipts dating back to 2012. Two days later, the company said it had addressed “a potential issue.”

“GovPayNet has addressed a potential issue with our online system that allows users to access copies of their receipts, but did not adequately restrict access only to authorized recipients,” the company said in a statement provided to KrebsOnSecurity.

The statement continues:

“The company has no indication that any improperly accessed information was used to harm any customer, and receipts do not contain information that can be used to initiate a financial transaction. Additionally, most information in the receipts is a matter of public record that may be accessed through other means. Nonetheless, out of an abundance of caution and to maximize security for users, GovPayNet has updated this system to ensure that only authorized users will be able to view their individual receipts. We will continue to evaluate security and access to all systems and customer records.”

In January 2018, GovPayNet was acquired by Securus Technologies, a Carrollton, Texas- based company that provides telecommunications services to prisons and helps law enforcement personnel keep tabs on mobile devices used by former inmates.

Although its name may suggest otherwise, Securus does not have a great track record in securing data. In May 2018, the New York Times broke the news that Securus’ service for tracking the cell phones of convicted felons was being abused by law enforcement agencies to track the real-time location of mobile devices used by people who had only been suspected of committing a crime. The story observed that authorities could use the service to track the real-time location of nearly any mobile phone in North America.

Just weeks later, Motherboard reported that hackers had broken into Securus’ systems and stolen the online credentials for multiple law enforcement officials who used the company’s systems to track the location of suspects via their mobile phone number.

A story here on May 22 illustrated how Securus’ site appeared to allow anyone to reset the password of an authorized Securus user simply by guessing the answer to one of three pre-selected “security questions,” including “what is your pet name,” “what is your favorite color,” and “what town were you born in”. Much like GovPayNet, the Securus Web site seemed to have been erected sometime in the aughts and left to age ungracefully for years.

Choose wisely and you, too, could gain the ability to look up anyone’s precise mobile location.

Data exposures like these are some of the most common but easily preventable forms of information leaks online. In every case, it was trivial to enumerate how many records were exposed because each record was sequential.

E-commerce sites can mitigate such leaks by using something other than easily-guessed or sequential record numbers, and/or encrypting unique portions of the URL displayed to customers upon payment.

Although fixing these information disclosure vulnerabilities is quite simple, it’s remarkable how many organizations that should know better don’t invest the resources needed to find and fix them. In August, KrebsOnSecurity disclosed a similar flaw at work across hundreds of small bank Web sites run by Fiserv, a major provider of technology services to financial institutions.

In July, identity theft protection service LifeLock fixed an information disclosure flaw that needlessly exposed the email address of millions of subscribers. And in April 2018, PaneraBread.com remedied a weakness that exposed millions of customer names, email and physical addresses, birthdays and partial credit card numbers.

Got a tip about a security vulnerability similar to those detailed above, or perhaps something more serious? Please drop me a note at krebsonsecurity @ gmail.com.

Categories: Krebs

U.S. Mobile Giants Want to be Your Online Identity

KrebsOnSecurity - Wed, 09/12/2018 - 4:58pm

The four major U.S. wireless carriers today detailed a new initiative that may soon let Web sites eschew passwords and instead authenticate visitors by leveraging data elements unique to each customer’s phone and mobile subscriber account, such as location, customer reputation, and physical attributes of the device. Here’s a look at what’s coming, and the potential security and privacy trade-offs of trusting the carriers to handle online authentication on your behalf.

Tentatively dubbed “Project Verify” and still in the private beta testing phase, the new authentication initiative is being pitched as a way to give consumers both a more streamlined method of proving one’s identity when creating a new account at a given Web site, as well as replacing passwords and one-time codes for logging in to existing accounts at participating sites.

Here’s a promotional and explanatory video about Project Verify produced by the Mobile Authentication Task Force, whose members include AT&T, Sprint, T-Mobile and Verizon:

The mobile companies say Project Verify can improve online authentication because they alone have access to several unique signals and capabilities that can be used to validate each customer and their mobile device(s). This includes knowing the approximate real-time location of the customer; how long they have been a customer and used the device in question; and information about components inside the customer’s phone that are only accessible to the carriers themselves, such as cryptographic signatures tied to the device’s SIM card.

The Task Force currently is working on building its Project Verify app into the software that gets pre-loaded onto mobile devices sold by the four major carriers. The basic idea is that third-party Web sites could let the app (and, by extension, the user’s mobile provider) handle the process of authenticating the user’s identity, at which point the app would interactively log the user in without the need of a username and password.

In another example, participating sites could use Project Verify to supplement or replace existing authentication processes, such as two-factor methods that currently rely on sending the user a one-time passcode via SMS/text messages, which can be intercepted by cybercrooks.

The carriers also are pitching their offering as a way for consumers to pre-populate data fields on a Web site — such as name, address, credit card number and other information typically entered when someone wants to sign up for a new user account at a Web site or make purchases online.

Johannes Jaskolski, general manager for Mobile Authentication Task Force and assistant vice president of identity security at AT&T, said the group is betting that Project Verify will be attractive to online retailers partly because it can help them capture more sign-ups and sales from users who might otherwise balk at having to manually provide lots of data via a mobile device.

“We can be a primary authenticator where, just by authenticating to our app, you can then use that service,” Jaskolski said. “That can be on your mobile, but it could also be on another device. With subscriber consent, we can populate that information and make it much more effortless to sign up for or sign into services online. In other markets, we have found this type of approach reduced [customer] fall-out rates, so it can make third-party businesses more successful in capturing that.”

Jaskolski said customers who take advantage of Project Verify will be able to choose what types of data get shared between their wireless provider and a Web site on a per-site basis, or opt to share certain data elements across the board with sites that leverage the app for authentication and e-commerce.

“Many companies already rely on the mobile device today in their customer authentication flows, but what we’re saying is there’s going to be a better way to do this in a method that is intended from the start to serve authentication use cases,” Jaskolski said. “This is what everyone has been seeking from us already in co-opting other mobile features that were simply never designed for authentication.”

‘A DISMAL TRACK RECORD’

A key question about adoption of this fledgling initiative will be how much trust consumers place with the wireless companies, which have struggled mightily over the past several years to validate that their own customers are who they say they are.

All four major mobile providers currently are struggling to protect customers against scams designed to seize control over a target’s mobile phone number. In an increasingly common scenario, attackers impersonate the customer over the phone or in mobile retail stores in a bid to get the target’s number transferred to a device they control. When successful, these attacks — known as SIM swaps and mobile number port-out scams —  allow thieves to intercept one-time authentication codes sent to a customer’s mobile device via text message or automated phone-call.

Nicholas Weaver, a researcher at the International Computer Science Institute and lecturer at UC Berkeley, said this new solution could make mobile phones and their associated numbers even more of an attractive target for cyber thieves.

Weaver said after he became a victim of a SIM swapping attack a few years back, he was blown away when he learned how simple it was for thieves to impersonate him to his mobile provider.

“SIM swapping is very much in the news now, but it’s been a big problem for at least the last half-decade,” he said. “In my case, someone went into a Verizon store, took over the account, and added themselves as an authorized user under their name — not even under my name — and told the store he needed a replacement phone because his broke. It took me three days to regain control of the account in a way that the person wasn’t able to take it back away from me.”

Weaver said Project Verify could become an extremely useful way for Web sites to onboard new users. But he said he’s skeptical of the idea that the solution would be much of an improvement for multi-factor authentication on third-party Web sites.

“The carriers have a dismal track record of authenticating the user,” he said. “If the carriers were trustworthy, I think this would be unequivocally a good idea. The problem is I don’t trust the carriers.”

It probably doesn’t help that all of the carriers participating in this effort were recently caught selling the real-time location data of their customers’ mobile devices to a host of third-party companies that utterly failed to secure online access to that sensitive data.

On May 10, The New York Times broke the news that a cell phone location tracking company called Securus Technologies had been selling or giving away location data on customers of virtually any major mobile network provider to local police forces across the United States.

A few weeks after the NYT scoop, KrebsOnSecurity broke the story that LocationSmart — a wireless data aggregator — hosted a public demo page on its Web site that would let anyone look up the real-time location data on virtually any U.S. mobile subscriber.

In response, all of the major mobile companies said they had terminated location data sharing agreements with LocationSmart and several other companies that were buying the information. The carriers each insisted that they only shared this data with customer consent, although it soon emerged that the mobile giants were instead counting on these data aggregators to obtain customer consent before sharing this location data with third parties, a sort of transitive trust relationship that appears to have been completely flawed from the get-go.

AT&T’s Jaskolski said the mobile giants are planning to use their new solution to further protect customers against SIM swaps.

“We are planning to use this as an additional preventative control,” Jaskolski said. “For example, just because you swap in a new SIM, that doesn’t mean the mobile authentication profile we’ve created is ported as well. In this case, porting your sim won’t necessarily port your mobile authentication profile.”

Jaskolski emphasized that Project Verify would not seek to centralize subscriber data into some new giant cross-carrier database.

“We’re not going to be aggregating and centralizing this subscriber data, which will remain with each carrier separately,” he said. “And this is very much a pro-competition solution, because it will be portable by design and is not designed to keep a subscriber stuck to one specific carrier. More importantly, the user will be in control of whatever gets shared with third parties.”

My take? The carriers can make whatever claims they wish about the security and trustworthiness of this new offering, but it’s difficult to gauge the sincerity and accuracy of those claims until the program is broadly available for beta testing and use — which is currently slated for sometime in 2019.

As with most things related to cybersecurity and identity online, much will depend on the default settings the carriers decide to stitch into their apps, and more importantly the default settings of third-party Web site apps designed to interact with Project Verify.

Jaskolski said the coalition is hoping to kick off the program next year in collaboration with some major online e-commerce platforms that have expressed interest in the initiative, although he declined to talk specifics on that front. He added that the mobile providers are currently working through exactly what those defaults might look like, but also acknowledged that some of those platforms have expressed an interest in forcing users to opt-out of sharing specific subscriber data elements.

“Users will be able to see exactly what attributes will be shared, and they can say yes or no to those,” he said. “In some cases, the [third-party site] can say here are some things I absolutely need, and here are some things we’d like to have. Those are some of the things we’re working through now.”

Categories: Krebs

Patch Tuesday, September 2018 Edition

KrebsOnSecurity - Tue, 09/11/2018 - 4:35pm

Adobe and Microsoft today each released patches to fix serious security holes in their software. Adobe pushed out a new version of its beleaguered Flash Player browser plugin. Redmond issued updates to address at least 61 distinct vulnerabilities in Microsoft Windows and related programs, including several flaws that were publicly detailed prior to today and one “zero-day” bug in Windows that is already being actively exploited by attackers.

As per usual, the bulk of the fixes from Microsoft tackle security weaknesses in the company’s Web browsers, Internet Explorer and Edge. Patches also are available for Windows, Office, Sharepoint, and the .NET Framework, among other components.

Of the 61 bugs fixed in this patch batch, 17 earned Microsoft’s “critical” rating, meaning malware or miscreants could use them to break into Windows computers with little or no help from users.

The zero-day flaw, CVE-2018-8440, affects Microsoft operating systems from Windows 7 through Windows 10 and allows a program launched by a restricted Windows user to gain more powerful administrative access on the system. It was first publicized August 27 in a (now deleted) Twitter post that linked users to proof-of-concept code hosted on Github. Since then, security experts have spotted versions of the code being used in active attacks.

According to security firm Ivanti, prior to today bad guys got advance notice about three vulnerabilities in Windows targeted by these patches. The first, CVE-2018-8457, is a critical memory corruption issue that could be exploited through a malicious Web site or Office file. CVE-2018-8475 is a critical bug in most supported versions of Windows that can be used for nasty purposes by getting a user to view a specially crafted image file. The third previously disclosed flaw, CVE-2018-8409, is a somewhat less severe “denial-of-service” vulnerability.

Standard advice about Windows patches: Not infrequently, Redmond ships updates that end up causing stability issues for some users, and it doesn’t hurt to wait a day or two before seeing if any major problems are reported with new updates before installing them. Windows 10 likes to install patches and reboot your computer on its own schedule, and Microsoft doesn’t make it easy for Windows 10 users to change this setting, but it is possible. For all other Windows OS users, if you’d rather be alerted to new updates when they’re available so you can choose when to install them, there’s a setting for that in Windows Update.

It’s a good idea to get in the habit of backing up your computer before applying monthly updates from Microsoft. Windows has some built-in tools that can help recover from bad patches, but restoring the system to a backup image taken just before installing updates is often much less hassle and an added peace of mind while you’re sitting there praying for the machine to reboot successfully after patching.

The sole non-Microsoft update pushed by Redmond today fixes a single vulnerability in Adobe Flash Player, CVE-2018-15967. Curiously, Adobe lists the severity of this information disclosure bug as “important,” while Microsoft considers it a more dangerous “critical” flaw.

Regardless, if you have Adobe Flash Player installed, it’s time to either update your browser and/or operating system, or else disable this problematic and insecure plugin. Windows Update should install the Flash Patch for IE/Edge users; the newest version of Google Chrome, which bundles Flash but prompts users to run Flash elements on a Web page by default, also includes the fix (although a complete Chrome shutdown and restart may be necessary before the fix is in).

Loyal readers here know full well where I stand on Flash: This is a dangerous, oft-exploited program that needs to be relegated to the dustbin of Internet history (for its part, Adobe has said it plans to retire Flash Player in 2020). Fortunately, disabling Flash in Chrome is simple enough. Paste “chrome://settings/content” into a Chrome browser bar and then select “Flash” from the list of items.

By default, Mozilla Firefox on Windows computers with Flash installed runs Flash in a “protected mode,” which prompts the user to decide if they want to enable the plugin before Flash content runs on a Web site.

Administrators have the ability to change Flash Player’s behavior when running Internet Explorer on Windows 7 by prompting the user before playing Flash content. A guide on how to do that is here (PDF). Administrators may also consider implementing Protected View for Office. Protected View opens a file marked as potentially unsafe in Read-only mode.

As always, please feel free to leave a note in the comments below if you experience any issues installing these fixes. Happy patching!

Categories: Krebs

In a Few Days, Credit Freezes Will Be Fee-Free

KrebsOnSecurity - Mon, 09/10/2018 - 10:26pm

Later this month, all of the three major consumer credit bureaus will be required to offer free credit freezes to all Americans and their dependents. Maybe you’ve been holding off freezing your credit file because your home state currently charges a fee for placing or thawing a credit freeze, or because you believe it’s just not worth the hassle. If that accurately describes your views on the matter, this post may well change your mind.

A credit freeze — also known as a “security freeze” — restricts access to your credit file, making it far more difficult for identity thieves to open new accounts in your name.

Currently, many states allow the big three bureaus — Equifax, Experian and TransUnion — to charge a fee for placing or lifting a security freeze. But thanks to a federal law enacted earlier this year, after Sept. 21, 2018 it will be free to freeze and unfreeze your credit file and those of your children or dependents throughout the United States.

KrebsOnSecurity has for many years urged readers to freeze their files with the big three bureaus, as well as with a distant fourth — Innovis — and the NCTUE, an Equifax-operated credit checking clearinghouse relied upon by most of the major mobile phone providers.

There are dozens of private companies that specialize in providing consumer credit reports and scores to specific industries, including real estate brokers, landlords, insurers, debt buyers, employers, banks, casinos and retail stores. A handy PDF produced earlier this year by the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) lists all of the known entities that maintain, sell or share credit data on U.S. citizens.

The CFPB’s document includes links to Web sites for 46 different consumer credit reporting entities, along with information about your legal rights to obtain data in your reports and dispute suspected inaccuracies with the companies as needed. My guess is the vast majority of Americans have never heard of most of these companies.

Via numerous front-end Web sites, each of these mini credit bureaus serve thousands or tens of thousands of people who work in the above mentioned industries and who have the ability to pull credit and other personal data on Americans. In many cases, online access to look up data through these companies is secured by nothing more than a username and password that can be stolen or phished by cybercrooks and abused to pull privileged information on consumers.

In other cases, it’s trivial for anyone to sign up for these services. For example, how do companies that provide background screening and credit report data to landlords decide who can sign up as a landlord? Answer: Anyone can be a landlord (or pretend to be one).

SCORE ONE FOR FREEZES

The truly scary part? Access to some of these credit lookup services is supposed to be secured behind a login page, but often isn’t. Consider the service pictured below, which for $44 will let anyone look up the credit score of any American who hasn’t already frozen their credit files with the big three. Worse yet, you don’t even need to have accurate information on a target — such as their Social Security number or current address.

KrebsOnSecurity was made aware of this particular portal by Alex Holden, CEO of Milwaukee, Wisc.-based cybersecurity firm Hold Security LLC [full disclosure: This author is listed as an adviser to Hold Security, however this is and always has been a volunteer role for which I have not be compensated].

Holden’s wife Lisa is a real estate agent, and as such she has access to a more full-featured version of the above-pictured consumer data lookup service (among others) for the purposes of helping clients determine a range of mortgage rates available. Mrs. Holden said the version of this service that she has access to will return accurate, current and complete credit file information on consumers even if one enters a made-up SSN and old address on an individual who hasn’t yet frozen their credit files with the big three.

“I’ve noticed in the past when I do a hard pull on someone’s credit report and the buyer gave me the wrong SSN or transposed some digits, not only will these services give me their credit report and full account history, it also tells you what their correct SSN is,” Mrs. Holden said.

With Mr. Holden’s permission, I gave the site pictured above an old street address for him plus a made-up SSN, and provided my credit card number to pay for the report. The document generated by that request said TransUnion and Experian were unable to look up his credit score with the information provided. However, Equifax not only provided his current credit score, it helpfully corrected the false data I entered for Holden, providing the last four digits of his real SSN and current address.

“We assume our credit report is keyed off of our SSN or something unique about ourselves,” Mrs. Holden said. “But it’s really keyed off your White Pages information, meaning anyone can get your credit report if they are in the know.”

I was pleased to find that I was unable to pull my own credit score through this exposed online service, although the site still charged me $44. The report produced simply said the consumer in question had requested that access to this information be restricted. But the real reason was simply that I’ve had my credit file frozen for years now.

Many media outlets are publishing stories this week about the one-year anniversary of the breach at Equifax that exposed the personal and financial data on more than 147 million people. But it’s important for everyone to remember that as bad as the Equifax breach was (and it was a total dumpster fire all around), most of the consumer data exposed in the breach has been for sale in the cybercrime underground for many years on a majority of Americans — including access to consumer credit reports. If anything, the Equifax breach may have simply helped ID thieves refresh some of those criminal data stores.

It costs $35 worth of bitcoin through this cybercrime service to pull someone’s credit file from the three major credit bureaus. There are many services just like this one, which almost certainly abuse hacked accounts from various industries that have “legitimate” access to consumer credit reports.

THE FEE-FREE FREEZE

According to the U.S. Federal Trade Commission, when the new law takes effect on September 21, Equifax, Experian and TransUnion must each set up a webpage for requesting fraud alerts and credit freezes.

The law also provides additional ID theft protections to minors. Currently, some state laws allow you to freeze a child’s credit file, while others do not. Starting Sept. 21, no matter where you live you’ll be able to get a free credit freeze for kids under 16 years old.

Identity thieves can and often do target minors, but usually this type of fraud usually isn’t discovered until the affected individual tries to apply for credit for the first time, at which point it can be a long and expensive road to undo the mess. As such, I would highly recommend that readers who have children or dependents take full advantage of this offering once it’s available for free nationwide.

In addition, the law requires the big three bureaus to offer free electronic credit monitoring services to all active duty military personnel. It also changes the rules for “fraud alerts,” which currently are free but only last for 90 days. With a fraud alert on your credit file, lenders or service providers should not grant credit in your name without first contacting you to obtain your approval — by phone or whatever other method you specify when you apply for the fraud alert.

Under the new law, fraud alerts last for one year, but consumers can renew them each year. Bear in mind, however, that while lenders and service providers are supposed to seek and obtain your approval if you have a fraud alert on your file, they’re not legally required to do this.

A key unanswered question about these changes is whether the new dedicated credit bureau freeze sites will work any more reliably than the current freeze sites operated by the big three bureaus. The Web and social media are littered with consumer complaints — particularly over the past year — about the various freeze sites freezing up and returning endless error messages, or simply discouraging consumers from filing a freeze thanks to insecure Web site components.

It will be interesting to see whether these new freeze sites will try to steer consumers away from freezes and toward other in-house offerings, such as paid credit reports, credit monitoring, or “credit lock” services. All three big bureaus tout their credit lock services as an easier and faster alternative to freezes.

According to a recent post by CreditKarma.com, consumers can use these services to quickly lock or unlock access to credit inquiries, although some bureaus can take up to 48 hours. In contrast, they can take up to five business days to act on a freeze request, although in my experience the automated freeze process via the bureaus’ freeze sites has been more or less instantaneous (assuming the request actually goes through).

TransUnion and Equifax both offer free credit lock services, while Experian’s is free for 30 days and $19.99 for each additional month. However, TransUnion says those who take advantage of their free lock service agree to receive targeted marketing offers. What’s more, TransUnion also pushes consumers who sign up for its free lock service to subscribe to its “premium” lock services for a monthly fee with a perpetual auto-renewal.

Unsurprisingly, the bureaus’ use of the term credit lock has confused many consumers; this was almost certainly by design. But here’s one basic fact consumers should keep in mind about these lock services: Unlike freezes, locks are not governed by any law, meaning that the credit bureaus can change the terms of these arrangements when and if it suits them to do so.

If you’d like to go ahead with freezing your credit files now, this Q&A post from the Equifax breach explains the basics, and includes some other useful tips for staying ahead of identity thieves. Otherwise, check back here later this month for more details on the new free freeze sites.

Categories: Krebs

Leader of DDoS-for-Hire Gang Pleads Guilty to Bomb Threats

KrebsOnSecurity - Thu, 09/06/2018 - 11:51am

A 19-year-old man from the United Kingdom who headed a cybercriminal group whose motto was “Feds Can’t Touch Us” pleaded guilty this week to making bomb threats against thousands of schools.

On Aug. 31, officers with the U.K.’s National Crime Agency (NCA) arrested Hertfordshire resident George Duke-Cohan, who admitted making bomb threats to thousands of schools and a United Airlines flight traveling from the U.K. to San Francisco last month.

One of many tweets from the attention-starved Apophis Squad, which launched multiple DDoS attacks against KrebsOnsecurity and Protonmail over the past few months.

Duke-Cohan — a.k.a. “7R1D3N7,” “DoubleParallax” and “Optcz1” — was among the most vocal members of a group of Internet hooligans that goes by the name “Apophis Squad,” which for the better part of 2018 has been launching distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks against multiple Web sites, including KrebsOnSecurity and Protonmail.com.

Incredibly, all self-described members of Duke-Cohan’s clique were active users of Protonmail, even as they repeatedly attacked its servers and taunted the company on social media.

“What we found, combined with intelligence provided by renowned cyber security journalist Brian Krebs, allowed us to conclusively identify Duke-Cohan as a member of Apophis Squad in the first week of August, and we promptly informed law enforcement,” Protonmail wrote in a blog post published today. “British police did not move to immediately arrest Duke-Cohan however, and we believe there were good reasons for that. Unfortunately, this meant that through much of August, ProtonMail remained under attack, but due to the efforts of Radware, ProtonMail users saw no impact.”

The DDoS-for-hire service run by Apophis Squad listed their members.

On Aug. 9, 2018, the attention-seeking Apophis Squad claimed on their Twitter account that flight UAL 949 had been grounded due to their actions.

“In a recording of one of the phone calls which was made while the plane was in the air, he takes on the persona of a worried father and claims his daughter contacted him from the flight to say it had been hijacked by gunmen, one of whom had a bomb,” the NCA said of Duke-Cohan’s actions in a press release on Sept. 4. “On arrival in San Francisco the plane was the subject of a significant security operation in a quarantined area of the airport. All 295 passengers had to remain on board causing disruption to onward journeys and financial loss to the airline.”

The Apophis Squad modeled itself after the actions of the Lizard Squad, another group of e-fame seeking online hoodlums who also ran a DDoS-for-hire service, called in bomb threats to airlines, DDoSed this Web site repeatedly and whose members were nearly all subsequently arrested and charged with various cybercrimes. Indeed, the Apophis Squad’s Web site and DDoS-for-hire service is hosted on the same Internet server used by a handful of other domains that were tied to the Lizard Squad.

Unsophisticated but otherwise time-wasting and annoying groups like Apophis Squad are a dime a dozen. But as I like to say, each time my site gets attacked by one of them two things usually happen not long after: Those responsible get arrested, and I get at least one decent story out of it. And if Protonmail is right, there are additional charges on the way.

“We believe further charges are pending, along with possible extradition to the US,” the company said. “In recent weeks, we have further identified a number of other individuals engaged in attacks against ProtonMail, and we are working with the appropriate authorities to bring them to justice.”

Categories: Krebs

Browser Extensions: Are They Worth the Risk?

KrebsOnSecurity - Wed, 09/05/2018 - 6:55pm

Popular file-sharing site Mega.nz is warning users that cybercriminals hacked its browser extension for Google Chrome so that any usernames and passwords submitted through the browser were copied and forwarded to a rogue server in Ukraine. This attack serves as a fresh reminder that legitimate browser extensions can and periodically do fall into the wrong hands, and that it makes good security sense to limit your exposure to such attacks by getting rid of extensions that are no longer useful or actively maintained by developers.

In a statement posted to its Web site, Mega.nz said the extension for Chrome was compromised after its Chrome Web store account was hacked. From their post:

“On 4 September 2018 at 14:30 UTC, an unknown attacker uploaded a trojaned version of MEGA’s Chrome extension, version 3.39.4, to the Google Chrome webstore. Upon installation or autoupdate, it would ask for elevated permissions (Read and change all your data on the websites you visit) that MEGA’s real extension does not require and would (if permissions were granted) exfiltrate credentials for sites including amazon.com, live.com, github.com, google.com (for webstore login), myetherwallet.com, mymonero.com, idex.market and HTTP POST requests to other sites, to a server located in Ukraine. Note that mega.nz credentials were not being exfiltrated.”

Browser extensions can be incredibly handy and useful, but compromised extensions — depending on the level of “permissions” or access originally granted to them — also can give attackers access to all data on your computer and the Web sites you visit.

For its part, Google tries to communicate the potential risk of extensions using three “alert” levels: Low, medium and high, as detailed in the screenshot below. In practice, however, most extensions carry the medium or high alert level, which means that if the extension is somehow compromised (or malicious from the get-go), the attacker in control of it is going to have access to ton of sensitive information on a great many Internet users.

In many instances — as in this week’s breach with Mega — an extension gets compromised after someone with legitimate rights to alter its code gets phished or hacked. In other cases, control and ownership of an established extension may simply be abandoned or sold to shady developers. In either scenario, hacked or backdoored extensions can present a nightmare scenario for users.

A basic tenet of cybersecurity holds that individuals and organizations can mitigate the risk of getting hacked to some degree by reducing their overall “attack surface” — i.e., the amount of software and services they rely upon that are potentially vulnerable to compromise. That precept holds fast here as well, because limiting one’s reliance on third-party browser extensions reduces one’s risk significantly.

Personally, I do not make much use of browser extensions. In almost every case I’ve considered installing an extension I’ve been sufficiently spooked by the permissions requested that I ultimately decided it wasn’t worth the risk. I currently trust just three extensions in my Google Chrome installation; two of them are made by Google and carry “low” risk alert levels. The other is a third-party extension I’ve used for years that carries a “medium” risk rating, but that is also maintained by an individual I know who is extremely paranoid and security-conscious.

If you’re the type of person who uses multiple extensions, it may be wise to adopt a risk-based approach going forward. In other words, given the high stakes that typically come with installing an extension, consider carefully whether having a given extension is truly worth it. By the way, this applies equally to plug-ins designed for Web site content management systems like WordPress and Joomla.

At the very least, do not agree to update an extension if it suddenly requests more permissions than a previous version. This should be a giant red flag that something is not right.

Also, never download and install an extension just because a Web site says you need it to view some type of content. Doing otherwise is almost always a high-risk proposition. Here, Rule #1 from KrebsOnSecurity’s Three Rules of Online Safety comes into play: “If you didn’t go looking for it, don’t install it.” Finally, in the event you do wish to install something, make sure you’re getting it directly from the entity that produced the software.

Google Chrome users can see any extensions they have installed by clicking the three dots to the right of the address bar, selecting “More tools” in the resulting drop-down menu, then “Extensions.” In Firefox, click the three horizontal bars next to the address bar and select “Add-ons,” then click the “Extensions” link on the resulting page to view any installed extensions.

Categories: Krebs

For 2nd Time in 3 Years, Mobile Spyware Maker mSpy Leaks Millions of Sensitive Records

KrebsOnSecurity - Tue, 09/04/2018 - 1:22pm

mSpy, the makers of a software-as-a-service product that claims to help more than a million paying customers spy on the mobile devices of their kids and partners, has leaked millions of sensitive records online, including passwords, call logs, text messages, contacts, notes and location data secretly collected from phones running the stealthy spyware.

Less than a week ago, security researcher Nitish Shah directed KrebsOnSecurity to an open database on the Web that allowed anyone to query up-to-the-minute mSpy records for both customer transactions at mSpy’s site and for mobile phone data collected by mSpy’s software. The database required no authentication.

A list of data points that can be slurped from a mobile device that is secretly running mSpy’s software.

Before it was taken offline sometime in the past 12 hours, the database contained millions of records, including the username, password and private encryption key of each mSpy customer who logged in to the mSpy site or purchased an mSpy license over the past six months. The private key would allow anyone to track and view details of a mobile device running the software, Shah said.

In addition, the database included the Apple iCloud username and authentication token of mobile devices running mSpy, and what appear to be references to iCloud backup files. Anyone who stumbled upon this database also would have been able to browse the Whatsapp and Facebook messages uploaded from mobile devices equipped with mSpy.

Usernames, passwords, text messages and loads of other more personal details were leaked from mobile devices running mSpy.

Other records exposed included the transaction details of all mSpy licenses purchased over the last six months, including customer name, email address, mailing address and amount paid. Also in the data set were mSpy user logs — including the browser and Internet address information of people visiting the mSpy Web site.

Shah said when he tried to alert mSpy of his findings, the company’s support personnel ignored him.

“I was chatting with their live support, until they blocked me when I asked them to get me in contact with their CTO or head of security,” Shah said.

KrebsOnSecurity alerted mSpy about the exposed database on Aug. 30. This morning I received an email from mSpy’s chief security officer, who gave only his first name, “Andrew.”

“We have been working hard to secure our system from any possible leaks, attacks, and private information disclosure,” Andrew wrote. “All our customers’ accounts are securely encrypted and the data is being wiped out once in a short period of time. Thanks to you we have prevented this possible breach and from what we could discover the data you are talking about could be some amount of customers’ emails and possibly some other data. However, we could only find that there were only a few points of access and activity with the data.”

Some of those “points of access” were mine. In fact, because mSpy’s Web site access logs were leaked I could view evidence of my own activity on their site in real-time via the exposed database, as could Shah of his own poking around.

A screen shot of the exposed database. The records shown here are non-sensitive “debug” logs.

WHO IS MSPY?

mSpy has a history of failing to protect data about its customers and — just as critically — data secretly collected from mobile devices being spied upon by its software. In May 2015, KrebsOnSecurity broke the news that mSpy had been hacked and its customer data posted to the Dark Web.

At the time, mSpy initially denied suffering a breach for more than a week, even as many of its paying customers confirmed that their information was included in the mSpy database uploaded to the Dark Web. mSpy later acknowledged a breach to the BBC, saying it had been the victim of a “predatory attack” by blackmailers, and that the company had not given in to demands for money.

mSpy pledged to redouble its security efforts in the wake of the 2015 breach. But more than two weeks after news of the 2015 mSpy breach broke, the company still had not disabled links to countless screenshots on its servers that were taken from mobile devices running mSpy.

Mspy users can track Android and iPhone users, snoop on apps like Snapchat and Skype, and keep a record of everything the target does with his or her phone.

It’s unclear exactly where mSpy is based; the company’s Web site suggests it has offices in the United States, Germany and the United Kingdom, although the firm does not appear to list an official physical address. However, according to historic Web site registration records, the company is tied to a now-defunct firm called MTechnology LTD out of the United Kingdom.

Documents obtained from Companies House, an official register of corporations in the U.K., indicate that the two founding members of the company are self-described programmers Aleksey Fedorchuk and Pavel Daletski. Those records (PDF) indicate that Daletski is a British citizen, and that Mr. Fedorchuk is from Russia. Neither men could be reached for comment.

Court documents (PDF) obtained from the U.S. District Court in Jacksonville, Fla. regarding a trademark dispute involving mSpy and Daletski state that mSpy has a U.S.-based address of 800 West El Camino Real, in Mountain View, Calif. Those same court documents indicate that Daletski is a director at a firm based in the Seychelles called Bitex Group LTD. Interestingly, that lawsuit was brought by Retina-X Studios, an mSpy competitor based in Jacksonville, Fla. that makes a product called MobileSpy.

The latest mSpy security lapse comes days after a hacker reportedly broke into the servers of TheTruthSpy — another mobile spyware-as-a-service company — and stole logins, audio recordings, pictures and text messages from mobile devices running the software.

U.S. regulators and law enforcers have taken a dim view of companies that offer mobile spyware services like mSpy. In September 2014, U.S. authorities arrested a 31-year-old Hammad Akbar, the CEO of a Lahore-based company that makes a spyware app called StealthGenie. The FBI noted that while the company advertised StealthGenie’s use for “monitoring employees and loved ones such as children,” the primary target audience was people who thought their partners were cheating. Akbar was charged with selling and advertising wiretapping equipment.

“Advertising and selling spyware technology is a criminal offense, and such conduct will be aggressively pursued by this office and our law enforcement partners,” U.S. Attorney Dana Boente said in a press release tied to Akbar’s indictment.

Akbar pleaded guilty to the charges in November 2014, and according to the Justice Department he is “the first-ever person to admit criminal activity in advertising and selling spyware that invades an unwitting victim’s confidential communications.”

A public relations pitch from mSpy to KrebsOnSecurity in March 2015 stated that approximately 40 percent of the company’s users are parents interested in keeping tabs on their kids. Assuming that is a true statement, it’s ironic that so many parents may now have unwittingly exposed their kids to predators, bullies and other ne’er-do-wells thanks to this latest security debacle at mSpy.

As I wrote in a previous story about mSpy, I hope it’s clear that it is foolhardy to place any trust or confidence in a company whose reason for existence is secretly spying on people. Alas, the only customers who can truly “trust” a company like this are those who don’t care about the privacy and security of the device owner being spied upon.

Categories: Krebs

Alleged ‘Satori’ IoT Botnet Operator Sought Media Spotlight, Got Indicted

KrebsOnSecurity - Sun, 09/02/2018 - 10:31pm

A 20-year-old from Vancouver, Washington was indicted last week on federal hacking charges and for allegedly operating the “Satori” botnet, a malware strain unleashed last year that infected hundreds of thousands of wireless routers and other “Internet of Things” (IoT) devices. This outcome is hardly surprising given that the accused’s alleged alter ego has been relentless in seeking media attention for this global crime machine.

Schuchman, in an undated photo posted online and referenced in a “dox,” which alleged in Feb. 2018 that Schuchman was Nexus Zeta.

The Daily Beast‘s Kevin Poulsen broke the news last week that federal authorities in Alaska indicted Kenneth Currin Schuchman of Washington on two counts of violating the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act by using malware to damage computers between August and November 2017.

The 3-page indictment (PDF) is incredibly sparse, and includes few details about the meat of the charges against Schuchman. But according to Poulsen, the charges are related to Schuchman’s alleged authorship and use of the Satori botnet. Satori is a variant of the Mirai botnet, a powerful IoT malware strain that first came online in July 2016.

“Despite the havoc he supposedly wreaked, the accused hacker doesn’t seem to have been terribly knowledgeable about hacking,” Poulsen notes.

Schuchman reportedly went by the handle “Nexus Zeta,” the nickname used by a fairly inexperienced and clumsy ne’er-do-well who has tried on multiple occasions to get KrebsOnSecurity to write about the Satori botnet. In January 2018, Nexus Zeta changed the login page for his botnet control panel that he used to remotely control his hacked routers to include a friendly backhanded reference to this author:

The login prompt for Nexus Zeta’s IoT botnet included the message “Masuta is powered and hosted on Brian Kreb’s [sic] 4head.” To be precise, it’s a 5head.

This wasn’t the first time Nexus Zeta said hello. In late November 2017, he chatted me up on on Twitter and Jabber instant message for several days. Most of the communications came from two accounts: “9gigs_ProxyPipe” on Twitter, and ogmemes123@jabber.ru (9gigs_ProxyPipe would later change its Twitter alias to Nexus Zeta, and Nexus Zeta himself admitted that 9gigs_ProxyPipe was his Twitter account.)

In each case, this person wanted to talk about a new IoT botnet that he was “researching” and that he thought deserved special attention for its size and potential disruptive impact should it be used in a massive Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attack aimed at knocking a Web site offline — something for which Satori would soon become known.

A Jabber instant message conversation with Nexus Zeta on Nov. 29, 2017.

Nexus Zeta’s Twitter nickname initially confused me because both 9gigs and ProxyPipe are names claimed by Robert Coelho, owner of ProxyPipe hosting (9gigs is a bit from one of Coelho’s Skype account names). Coelho’s sleuthing was quite instrumental in helping to unmask 21-year-old New Jersey resident Paras Jha as the author of the original Mirai IoT botnet (Jha later pleaded guilty to co-authoring and using Mirai and is due to be sentenced this month in Alaska and New Jersey). “Ogmemes” is from a nickname used by Jha and his Mirai botnet co-author.

On Nov. 28, 2017, 9gigs_ProxyPipe sent a message to the KrebsOnSecurity Twitter account:

“I have some information in regards to an incredibly dangerous IoT botnet you may find interesting,” the Twitter message read. “Let me know how you would prefer to communicate assuming you are interested.”

We connected on Jabber instant message. In our chats, Ogmemes123 said he couldn’t understand why nobody had noticed a botnet powered by a Mirai variant that had infected hundreds of thousands of IoT devices (he estimated the size of the botnet to be about 300,000-500,000 at the time). He also talked a lot about how close he was with Jha. Nexus Zeta’s Twitter account profile photo is a picture of Paras Jha. He also said he knew this new botnet was being used to attack ProxyPipe.

Less than 24 hours after that tweet from Nexus Zeta, I heard from ProxyPipe’s Coelho. They were under attack from a new Mirai variant.

“We’ve been mitigating attacks recently that are about 270 gigabits [in volume],” Coelho wrote in an email. “Looks like somebody tagged you on Twitter pretending to be from ProxyPipe — likely the attacker? Just wanted to give you a heads up since that is not us, or anyone that works with ProxyPipe.”

From reviewing Nexus Zeta’s myriad postings on the newbie-friendly hacker forum Hackforums-dot-net, it was clear that Nexus Zeta was an inexperienced, impressionable young man who wanted to associate himself with people closely tied to the 2017 whodunnit over the original Mirai IoT botnet variant. He also asked other Hackforums members for assistance in assembling his Mirai botnet:

Some of Nexus Zeta’s posts on Hackforums, where he asks for help in setting up a Mirai botnet variant. Click to enlarge.

In one conversation with Ogmemes123, I lost my cool and told him to quit running botnets or else go bore somebody else with his quest for publicity. He mostly stopped bugging me after that. That same day, Nexus Zeta spotted a tweet from security researcher Troy Mursch about the rapid growth of a new Mirai-like botnet.

“This is an all-time record for the most new unique IP addresses that I’ve seen added to the botnet in one day,” Mursch tweeted of the speed with which this new Mirai strain was infecting devices.

For weeks after that tweet, Nexus Zeta exchanged private twitter messages with Mursch and his team of botnet hunters at Bad Packets LLC in a bid to get them to Tweet or write about Satori/Masuta.

The following screenshots from their private Twitter discussions, republished with Mursch’s permission, showed that Nexus Zeta kept up the fiction with Mursch about his merely “researching” the activities of Satori. Mursch played along, and asked gently probing questions about the size, makeup and activities of a rapidly growing Satori botnet.

9gigs_ProxyPipe (a.k.a. Nexus Zeta allegedly a.k.a Kenneth Schuchman) reaches out to security researcher Troy Mursch of Bad Packets LLC.

Early in their conversations, Nexus Zeta says he is merely following the visible daily Internet scanning that Satori generated each day in a constant search for newly infectable IoT devices. But as their conversations continue over several weeks, Nexus Zeta intimates that he has much deeper access to Satori.

In this conversation from Nov. 29, 2017 between Nexus Zeta/9gigs_Proxypipe and Troy Mursch, the former says he is seeing lots of Satori victims from Argentina, Columbia and Egypt.

Although it long ago would have been easy to write a series of stories about this individual and his exploits, I had zero interest in giving him the attention he clearly craved. But thanks to naivete and apparently zero sense of self-preservation, Nexus Zeta didn’t have to wait long for others to start connecting his online identities to his offline world.

On Dec. 5, Chinese cybersecurity firm Netlab360 released a report on Satori noting that the IoT malware was spreading rapidly to Chinese-made Huawei routers with the help of two security vulnerabilities, including one “zero day” flaw that was unknown to researchers at the time. The report said a quarter million infected devices were seen scanning for vulnerable systems, and that much of the scanning activity traced back to infected systems in Argentina, Columbia and Egypt, the same hotspots that Nexus Zeta cited in his Nov. 29 Twitter chat with Troy Mursch (see screen shot directly above).

In a taunting post published Dec. 29, 2017 titled “Good Zero Day Kiddie,” researchers at Israeli security firm CheckPoint pointed out that the domain name used as a control server to synchronize the activities of the Satori botnet — nexusiotsolutions-dot-net — was registered in 2016 to the email address nexuszeta1337@gmail.com. The CheckPoint report noted the name supplied in the original registration records for that domain was a “Caleb Wilson,” although the researchers correctly noted that this could be a pseudonym.

Perhaps the CheckPoint folks also knew the following tidbit, but chose not to publish it in their report: The email address nexuszeta1337@gmail.com was only ever used to register a single domain name (nexusiotsolutions-dot-net), according to a historic WHOIS record search at Domaintools.com [full disclosure: DomainTools is an advertiser on this site.] But the phone number in that original domain name record was used to register one other domain: zetastress-dot-net (a “stresser” is another name for a DDoS-for-hire-service). The registrant name listed in that original record? You guessed it:

Registrant Name: kenny Schuchman
Registrant Organization: ZetaSec Inc.
Registrant Street: 8709 Ne Mason Dr, No. 4
Registrant City: Vancouver
Registrant State/Province: Washington
Registrant Postal Code: 98662
Registrant Country: US
Registrant Phone: +1.3607267966
Registrant Phone Ext:
Registrant Fax:
Registrant Fax Ext:
Registrant Email: kenny.windwmx79@outlook.com

In April 2018 I heard from a source who said he engaged Nexus Zeta in a chat about his router-ravaging botnet and asked what kind of router Nexus Zeta trusted. According to my source, Nexus Zeta shared a screen shot of the output from his wireless modem’s Web interface, which revealed that he was connecting from an Internet service provider in Vancouver, Wash., where Schuchman lives.

The Satori botnet author shared this screen shot of his desktop, which indicated he was using an Internet connection in Vancouver, Washington — where Schuchman currently lives with his father.

“During our discussions, I learned we have the same model of router,” the source said. “He asked me my router model, and I told him. He shared that his router was also an ActionTec model, and sent a picture. This picture contains his home internet address.”

This matched a comprehensive “dox” that someone published on Pastebin in Feb. 2018, declaring Nexus Zeta to be 20-year-old Kenneth Currin Schuchman from Vancouver, Washington. The dox said Schuchman used the aliases Nexus Zeta and Caleb Wilson, and listed all of the email addresses tied to Nexus Zeta above, plus his financial data and physical address.

“Nexus is known by many to be autistic and a compulsive liar,” the dox begins.

“He refused to acknowledge that he was wrong or apologize, and since he has extremely poor opsec (uses home IP on everything), we have decided to dox him.

He was only hung around by few for the servers he had access to.
He lies about writing exploits that were made before his time, and faking bot counts on botnets he made.
He’s lied about having physical contact with Anna Senpai (Author of Mirai Botnet).”

As detailed in the Daily Beast story and Nexus Zeta’s dox, Schuchman was diagnosed with Asperger Syndrome and autism disorder, and at one point when he was 15 Schuchman reportedly wandered off while visiting a friend in Bend, Ore., briefly prompting a police search before he was found near his mother’s home in Vancouver, Wash.

Nexus Zeta clearly had limited hacking skills initially and almost no operational security. Indeed, his efforts to gain notoriety for his illegal hacking activities eventually earned him just that, as it usually does.

But it’s clear he was a quick learner; in the span of about a year, Nexus Zeta was able to progress from a relatively clueless newbie to the helm of an international menace that launched powerful DDoS attacks while ravaging hundreds of thousands of systems.

Categories: Krebs

Instagram’s New Security Tools are a Welcome Step, But Not Enough

KrebsOnSecurity - Wed, 08/29/2018 - 6:59pm

Instagram users should soon have more secure options for protecting their accounts against Internet bad guys.  On Tuesday, the Facebook-owned social network said it is in the process of rolling out support for third-party authentication apps. Unfortunately, this welcome new security offering does nothing to block Instagram account takeovers when thieves manage to hijack a target’s mobile phone number — an increasingly common crime.

New two-factor authentication options Instagram says it is rolling out to users over the next few weeks.

For years, security experts have warned that hackers are exploiting weak authentication at Instagram to commandeer accounts. Instagram has long offered users a security option to have a one-time code sent via text message to a mobile device, but these codes can be intercepted via several methods (more on that in a bit).

The new authentication offering requires users to download a third-party app like Authy, Duo or Google Authenticator, which generates a one-time code that needs to be entered after the user supplies a password.

In a blog post Tuesday, Instagram said support for third-party authenticator apps “has begun to roll out and will be available to the global community in the coming weeks.

Instagram put me on a whitelist of accounts to get an early peek at the new security feature, so these options probably aren’t yet available to most users. But there’s a screenshot below that shows the multi-factor options available in the mobile app. When these options do become more widely available, Instagram says people can use a third-party app to receive a one-time code. To do this:

  1. Go to your Settings.
  2. Scroll down and tap Two-Factor Authentication.
  3. If you haven’t already turned two-factor authentication on, tap Get Started.
  4. Tap next to Authentication App, then follow the on-screen instructions.
  5. Enter the confirmation code from the third party authentication app to complete the process.

Note that if you have previously enabled SMS-based authentication, it is likely still enabled unless and until you disable it. The app also prompts users to save a series of recovery codes, which should be kept in a safe place in case one’s mobile device is ever lost.

WHAT IT DOESN’T FIX

Instagram has received quite a lot of bad press lately from publications reporting numerous people who had their accounts hijacked even though they had Instagram’s SMS authentication turned on. The thing is, many of those stories have been about people having their Instagram accounts hijacked because fraudsters were able to hijack their mobile phone number.

In these cases, the fraudsters were able to hijack the Instagram accounts because Instagram allows users to reset their account passwords with a single factor — using nothing more than a text message sent to a mobile number on fileAnd nothing in these new authentication offerings will change that for people who have shared their mobile number with Instagram.

Criminals can and do exploit SMS-based password reset requests to hijack Instagram accounts by executing unauthorized “SIM swaps,” i.e., tricking the target’s mobile provider into transferring the phone number to a device or account they control and intercepting the password reset link sent via SMS. Once they hijack the target’s mobile number, they can then reset the password for the associated Instagram account.

I asked Instagram if there was any way for people who have supplied the company with their phone number to turn off SMS-based password reset requests. I received this response from their PR folks:

“I can confirm that disabling SMS two factor will not disable the ability to reset a password via SMS,” a spokesperson said via email. “We recommend that the community use a third-party app for authentication, in place of SMS authentication. We’ll continue to iterate and improve on this product to keep people safe on our platform.”

Fraudulent SIM swaps illustrate the value of moving away from SMS-based authentication when more secure options are available. Doing so makes one less likely to be targeted by these phone number hijacks, which are generally perpetrated by determined, well-organized attackers.

The hard truth is that if an attacker wants control over your mobile number badly enough, he will get it. And if he does, he will likely gain access to far more than your Instagram account: Someone who hacks your phone number can then compromise any account that allows authentication or password resets via text message or automated phone call.

In May, KrebsOnSecurity documented the case of a Boston man who had his Instagram account hijacked after a crooked T-Mobile employee transferred his phone number to another device without authorization. Additionally, authorities in California and Florida have recently arrested several men accused of conducting similar attacks, and according to charging documents all of these individuals routinely worked with associates at mobile phone stores to carry out their heists.

In case you missed it, KrebsOnSecurity ran a story earlier this month about the sound security advice allegedly offered by one of the most accomplished SIM swappers of late, who recommended using Internet-based phone services like Google Voice in lieu of relying on mobile phone providers for multi-factor authentication.

Standard disclaimer: If SMS-based authentication is the strongest form of extra security a Web site offers, this is still far better than relying on just passwords for login security. If app-based options are available, take advantage of that. If the site in question offers hardware-based security keys, even better. Twofactorauth.org lists multi-factor authentication options for hundreds of sites, including probably many that you use on a daily basis. Take a moment this week to strengthen your login options.

Categories: Krebs

Fiserv Flaw Exposed Customer Data at Hundreds of Banks

KrebsOnSecurity - Tue, 08/28/2018 - 9:27am

Fiserv, Inc., a major provider of technology services to financial institutions, just fixed a glaring weakness in its Web platform that exposed personal and financial details of countless customers across hundreds of bank Web sites, KrebsOnSecurity has learned.

Brookfield, Wisc.-based Fiserv [NASDAQ:FISV] is a Fortune 500 company with 24,000 employees and $5.7 billion in earnings last year. Its account and transaction processing systems power the Web sites for hundreds of financial institutions — mostly small community banks and credit unions.

Two weeks ago this author heard from security researcher Kristian Erik Hermansen, who said he’d discovered something curious while logged in to an account at a tiny local bank that uses Fiserv’s platform.

Hermansen had signed up to get email alerts any time a new transaction posted to his account, and he noticed the site assigned his alert a specific “event number.” Working on a hunch that these event numbers might be assigned sequentially and that other records might be available if requested directly, Hermansen requested the same page again but first edited the site’s code in his browser so that his event number was decremented by one digit.

In an instant, he could then view and edit alerts previously set up by another bank customer, and could see that customer’s email address, phone number and the last four digits of their bank account number.

Hermansen said a cybercriminal could abuse this access to enumerate all other accounts with activity alerts on file, and to add or delete phone numbers or email addresses to receive alerts about account transactions.

This would allow any customer of the bank to spy on the daily transaction activity of other customers, and perhaps even target customers who signed up for high minimum balance alerts (e.g., “alert me when the available balance goes below $5,000”).

“I shouldn’t be able to see this data,” Hermansen said. “Anytime you spend money that should be a private transaction between you and your bank, not available for everyone else to see.”

Hermansen said he told his bank about what he found, and that he tried unsuccessfully to get the attention of different Fiserv employees, including the company’s CEO via LinkedIn. But he wasn’t sure whether the flaw he found existed in all bank sites running on Fiserv’s ebanking platform, or just his bank’s installation.

Naturally, KrebsOnSecurity offered to help figure that out, and to get Fiserv’s attention, if warranted. Over the past week I signed up for accounts at two small local banks that each use Fiserv’s online banking platform.

In both cases I was able to replicate Hermansen’s findings and view email addresses, phone numbers, partial account numbers and alert details for other customers of each bank just by editing a single digit in a Web page request. I was relieved to find I could not use my online account access at one bank to view transaction alerts I’d set up at a different Fiserv affiliated bank.

A single digit changed in a Web browser request caused someone else’s alerts to pop up in my account at this small local bank in Virginia.

But it was not difficult to find hundreds of other Fiserv-affiliated banks that would be just as vulnerable. If a bank is using Fiserv’s platform, it usually says so somewhere at the bottom of the bank’s home page. Another giveaway is that most of the bank sites using Fiserv display the same root domain name in the browser address bar after login: secureinternetbank.com.

Fiserv said in a statement that the problem stemmed from an issue with “a messaging solution available to a subset of online banking clients.” Fiserv declined to say exactly how many financial institutions may have been impacted overall. But experts tells KrebsOnSecurity that some 1,700 banks currently use Fiserv’s retail (consumer-focused) banking platform alone.

“Fiserv places a high priority on security, and we have responded accordingly,” Fiserv spokesperson Ann Cave said. “After receiving your email, we promptly engaged appropriate resources and worked around the clock to research and remediate the situation. We developed a security patch within 24 hours of receiving notification and deployed the patch to clients that utilize a hosted version of the solution. We will be deploying the patch this evening to clients that utilize an in-house version of the solution.”

This author confirmed that Fiserv no longer shows a sequential event number in their banking sites and has replaced them with a pseudo-random string.

Julie Conroy, research director with market analyst firm Aite Group, said the kinds of banks that use Fiserv’s platform mostly are those that can’t afford to build and maintain their own.

“These financial institutions use a core banking provider like Fiserv because they don’t have the wherewithal to do it on their own, so they’re really trusting Fiserv to do this on their behalf,” Conroy said. “This will not only reflect on Fiserv’s brand, but also it will impact customer’s perception about their small local bank, which is already struggling to compete with the larger, nationwide institutions.”

Allen Weinberg, partner and co-founder at Glenbrook Partners LLC, said the ability of fraudsters to edit account transaction alerts somewhat negates the value of these alerts in helping consumers fight fraud tied to their online banking accounts.

“If a fraudster can just turn off the alerts, there’s one less protection that consumers think they have,” Weinberg said. “I think consumers do rely in large part on these alerts to help them detect fraudulent activity.”

The weaknesses in Fiserv’s platform is what’s known as an “information disclosure” vulnerability. While these are among the most common types of security issues with Web sites, they are also perhaps the most preventable and easily fixed.

Nevertheless, disclosure flaws can be just as damaging to a company’s brand as other more severe types of security errors. Other notable security incidents involving recent information disclosure issues include a weakness at Panera Bread’s site that exposed tens of millions of customer records, and a bug in identity protection service LifeLock’s site that revealed email addresses for millions of customers.

Categories: Krebs

Who’s Behind the Screencam Extortion Scam?

KrebsOnSecurity - Sat, 08/25/2018 - 7:35pm

The sextortion email scam last month that invoked a real password used by each recipient and threatened to release embarrassing Webcam videos almost certainly was not the work of one criminal or even one group of criminals. Rather, it’s likely that additional spammers and scammers piled on with their own versions of the phishing email after noticing that some recipients were actually paying up. The truth is we may never find out who’s responsible, but it’s still fun to follow some promising early leads and see where they take us.

On Aug. 7, 2018 — five days before my story about the sextortion scam innovation went viral — a user on the forum of free email service hMailServer posted a copy of the sextortion email he received, noting that it included a password he’d formerly used online.

Helpfully, this user pasted a great deal of information from the spam email message, including the domain name from which it was sent (williehowell-dot-com) and the Internet address of the server that sent the message (46.161.42.91).

A look at the other domain names registered to this IP address block 46.161.42.x reveals some interesting patterns:

46.161.42.51 mail25.uscourtsgov[.]com
46.161.42.52 mail24.uscourtsgov[.]com
46.161.42.53 mail23.uscourtsgov[.]com
46.161.42.54 mail22.uscourtsgov[.]com
46.161.42.55 mail21.uscourtsgov[.]com
46.161.42.56 mail20.uscourtsgov[.]com
46.161.42.57 mail19.uscourtsgov[.]com
46.161.42.58 mail18.uscourtsgov[.]com
46.161.42.59 mail17.uscourtsgov[.]com
46.161.42.60 mail16.uscourtsgov[.]com
46.161.42.61 mail15.uscourtsgov[.]com
46.161.42.62 mail14.uscourtsgov[.]com
46.161.42.63 mail13.uscourtsgov[.]com
46.161.42.64 mail12.uscourtsgov[.]com
46.161.42.65 mail11.uscourtsgov[.]com
46.161.42.66 mail10.uscourtsgov[.]com
46.161.42.67 mail9.uscourtsgov[.]com
46.161.42.68 mail8.uscourtsgov[.]com
46.161.42.69 mail7.uscourtsgov[.]com
46.161.42.70 mail6.uscourtsgov[.]com
46.161.42.71 mail5.uscourtsgov[.]com
46.161.42.72 mail4.uscourtsgov[.]com
46.161.42.73 mail3.uscourtsgov[.]com
46.161.42.74 mail2.uscourtsgov[.]com
46.161.42.75 mail1.uscourtsgov[.]com
46.161.42.76 mail[.]commarysmith[.]com
46.161.42.77 mail.joancooper[.]com
46.161.42.78 mail.florencewoods[.]com
46.161.42.79 mail.ednawest[.]com
46.161.42.80 mail.ethelwebb[.]com
46.161.42.81 mail.eleanorhunt[.]com
46.161.42.82 mail.sallypierce[.]com
46.161.42.83 mail.reginaberry[.]com
46.161.42.84 mail.junecarroll[.]com
46.161.42.85 mail.robertaharper[.]com
46.161.42.86 mail.reneelane[.]com
46.161.42.87 mail.almaaustin[.]com
46.161.42.88 mail.elsiekelley[.]com
46.161.42.89 mail.vickifields[.]com
46.161.42.90 mail.ellaoliver[.]com
46.161.42.91 mail.williehowell[.]com
46.161.42.92 mail.veramccoy[.]com
46.161.42.93 mail.agnesbishop[.]com
46.161.42.94 mail.tanyagilbert[.]com
46.161.42.95 mail.mattiehoffman[.]com
46.161.42.96 mail.hildahopkins[.]com
46.161.42.97 beckymiles[.]com
46.161.42.98 mail.fayenorris[.]com
46.161.42.99 mail.joannaleonard[.]com
46.161.42.100 mail.rosieweber[.]com
46.161.42.101 mail.candicemanning[.]com
46.161.42.102 mail.sherirowe[.]com
46.161.42.103 mail.leticiagoodman[.]com
46.161.42.104 mail.myrafrancis[.]com
46.161.42.105 mail.jasminemaxwell[.]com
46.161.42.106 mail.eloisefrench[.]com

Search Google for any of those two-name domains above (e.g., fayenorris-dot-com) and you’ll see virtually all of them were used in these sextortion emails, and most were registered at the end of May 2018 through domain registrar Namecheap.

Notice the preponderance of the domain uscourtsgov-dot-com in the list above. All of those two-name domains used domain name servers (DNS servers) from uscourtsgov-dot-com at the time these emails were sent. In early June 2018, uscourtsgov-dot-com was associated with a Sigma ransomware scam delivered via spam. Victims who wanted their files back had to pay a bitcoin ransom.

In the months just before either the password-laced sextortion scam or the uscourtsgov-dot-com ransomware scam, uscourtsgov-com was devoid of content, aside from a message promoting the spamming services of the web site mtaexpert-dot-info. Uscourtsgov-dot-com is now offline, but it was active as of two weeks ago. Here’s what its homepage looked like:

The domain uscourtsgov-dot-com was redirecting visitors to mtaexpert-dot-info for many months up to and including the sextortion email campaign. Image: Domaintools.com

Interestingly, this same message promoting mtaexpert-dot-info appeared on the homepages of many other two-name domain names mentioned above (including fayenorris-dot-com):

Like uscourtsgov-dot-com, Fayenorris-dot-com also urged visitors to go to mtaexpert-dot-info.

In the email delivery space, MTA stands for mail transfer agent, and this MTA Expert company is essentially an anonymous spamming service. The screen shot below is from an Internet Archive cached copy of mtaexpert-dot-info:

Mtaexpert-dot-info, as it appeared in Feb 2018. Source: Archive.org.

Mtaexpert-dot-info doesn’t disclose who owns the site, and current WHOIS registration records for the domain are obscured by privacy services. But thanks to a historic WHOIS record lookup at Domaintools.com [full disclosure: Domaintools is an advertiser on this site], we can see that for about a week in May 2018 the WHOIS privacy veil briefly dropped off and revealed the following record:

Registrant Name: HICHAM AALLAM
Registrant Organization: investissonsorg
Registrant Street: RED ANASS BLOC 26 N 3 ROUTE DE TETOUANE
Registrant City: TANGER
Registrant State/Province: Tanger-Tetouan
Registrant Postal Code: 90001
Registrant Country: MA
Registrant Phone: +212.626280317
Registrant Phone Ext:
Registrant Fax:
Registrant Fax Ext:
Registrant Email: hicham.aallam60@gmail.com

Who is Hicham Aallam? According to his LinkedIn page, he is an email marketer living in Morocco and working for a company called Active Sun Network. His resume says he also works for AdGenics, which according to anti-spam group Spamhaus is a well-known spamming operation with a long, sordid history. AdGenics, a.k.a. Cabo Networks a.k.a SIFT Logic, is currently Number Six on Spamhaus’ Top Ten Worst Spammers list.

Contacted via LinkedIn, Aallam said he was unaware that his email service was used in the either the sextortion or ransomware campaigns linked to the above-mentioned domains. He said an ad for Mtaexpert-dot-info automatically gets shown on the home page of any site that is configured to use his email-sending scripts.

Aallam says he charges customers to use these scripts, but that he only had one semi-recent customer: A person who contacted him using the Skype name “brian.ortega_4” paid roughly $250 worth of the cryptocurrency Ethereum (ETH) on Apr. 3, 2018 for a license to MTA Experts’ mailing script. Here is a record of that transaction. All of the ETH transactions attributed to and from that account can be seen here.

Okay, so we still might not know who’s responsible for sending some of these sextortion emails, and it could well be one of Aallam’s other clients behind these two schemes. Nevertheless, it’s always fascinating to see how far one can get just by following a few breadcrumbs.

One final breadcrumb to follow: The Internet address space occupied by the uscourtsgov-dot-com and the sextortion-related domains — 46.161.42.0/24. In May 2018, RiskIQ published a detailed report (PDF) about a complex phishing scheme that used an address adjacent to uscourtsgov-dot-com in a bid to steal Ethereum from MyEtherWallet users.

The registered owner of the Internet address space is a “Barbarich_Viacheslav_Yuryevich,” which is the same name as the owner of the network AS41995, a.k.a. web-shield-dot-biz.

A different block of addresses that we can see in the graphic above assigned to Web-Shield — 146.185.241.0/24 — contains a metric truckload of domains involved in selling stolen credit cards.

Loyal readers of this site will notice a familiar domain there: Rescator. It belongs to a seasonsed cybercriminal by the same name who has been closely linked to the Target and Sally Beauty breaches, among many others. To this day — almost four years after the Target breach — the home page to Rescator’s stolen card shop includes a picture of Yours Truly as a postage stamp that reads, “As advertised by Brian Krebs.”

KrebsOnSecurity would like to thank security researcher Troy Mursch and anti-spam crusader Ron Guilmette for their assistance in this research.

Categories: Krebs

Experts Urge Rapid Patching of ‘Struts’ Bug

KrebsOnSecurity - Thu, 08/23/2018 - 4:22pm

In September 2017, Equifax disclosed that a failure to patch one of its Internet servers against a pervasive software flaw — in a Web component known as Apache Struts — led to a breach that exposed personal data on 147 million Americans. Now security experts are warning that blueprints showing malicious hackers how to exploit a newly-discovered Apache Struts bug are available online, leaving countless organizations in a rush to apply new updates and plug the security hole before attackers can use it to wriggle inside.

On Aug. 22, the Apache Software Foundation released software updates to fix a critical vulnerability in Apache Struts, a Web application platform used by an estimated 65 percent of Fortune 100 companies. Unfortunately, computer code that can be used to exploit the bug has since been posted online, meaning bad guys now have precise instructions on how to break into vulnerable, unpatched servers.

Attackers can exploit a Web site running the vulnerable Apache Struts installation using nothing more than a Web browser. The bad guy simply needs to send the right request to the site and the Web server will run any command of the attacker’s choosing. At that point, the intruder could take any number of actions, such as adding or deleting files, or copying internal databases.

An alert about the Apache security update was posted Wednesday by Semmle, the San Francisco software company whose researchers discovered the bug.

“The widespread use of Struts by leading enterprises, along with the proven potential impact of this sort of vulnerability, illustrate the threat that this vulnerability poses,” the alert warns.

“Critical remote code execution vulnerabilities like the one that affected Equifax and the one we announced today are incredibly dangerous for several reasons: Struts is used for publicly-accessible customer-facing websites, vulnerable systems are easily identified, and the flaw is easy to exploit,” wrote Semmle co-founder Pavel Avgustinov. “A hacker can find their way in within minutes, and exfiltrate data or stage further attacks from the compromised system. It’s crucially important to update affected systems immediately; to wait is to take an irresponsible risk.”

The timeline in the 2017 Equifax breach highlights how quickly attackers can take advantage of Struts flaws. On March 7, 2017, Apache released a patch for a similarly dangerous Struts flaw, and within 24 hours of that update security experts began tracking signs that attackers were exploiting vulnerable servers.

Just three days after the patch was released, attackers found Equifax’s servers were vulnerable to the Apache Struts flaw, and used the vulnerability as an initial entry point into the credit bureau’s network.

A slide from “We are all Equifax,” an RSA talk given in April 2018 by Derek Weeks.

The vulnerability affects all supported versions of Struts 2. Users of Struts 2.3 should upgrade to version 2.3.35; users of Struts 2.5 should upgrade to 2.5.17.

More technical details about this bug from its discoverer, Man Yue Mo, are here. The Apache Software Foundation’s advisory is here.

Categories: Krebs

Alleged SIM Swapper Arrested in California

KrebsOnSecurity - Wed, 08/22/2018 - 12:58pm

Authorities in Santa Clara, Calif. have arrested and charged a 19-year-old area man on suspicion hijacking mobile phone numbers as part of a scheme to steal large sums of bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies. The arrest is the third known law enforcement action this month targeting “SIM swappers,” individuals who specialize in stealing wireless phone numbers and hijacking online financial and social media accounts tied to those numbers.

Xzavyer Clemente Narvaez was arrested Aug. 17, 2018 by investigators working with Santa Clara County’s “REACT task force,” which says it’s targeting those involved in “the takeovers of cell phone, email and financial accounts resulting in the theft of cryptocurrency.”

Prosecutors allege Narvaez used the proceeds of his crimes (estimated at > $1 million in virtual currencies) to purchase luxury items, including a McLaren — a $200,000 high-performance sports car. Investigators said they interviewed several alleged victims of Narvaez, including one man who reported being robbed of $150,000 in virtual currencies after his phone number was hijacked.

A fraudulent SIM swap occurs when a victim’s cell phone service is redirected from a SIM card under the control of the victim to one under the control of the suspect, without the knowledge or authorization of the victim account holder.

When a victim experiences a fraudulent SIM swap, their phone suddenly has no service and all incoming calls and text messages are sent to the attacker’s device. This includes any one-time codes sent via text message or automated phone call that many companies use to supplement passwords for their online accounts.

Narvaez came to law enforcement’s attention following the arrest of Joel Ortiz, a gifted 20-year-old college student from Boston who was charged in July 2018 with using SIM swaps to steal more than $5 million in cryptocurrencies from 40 victims.

A redacted statement of facts Santa Clara prosecutors shared with KrebsOnSecurity says records obtained from Google revealed that a cellular device used by Ortiz to commit SIM swaps had at one point been used to access the Google account identified as Xzavyer.Narvaez@gmail.com.

That statement refers frequently to the term IMEI; this is the International Mobile Equipment Identity number, which is a unique identification number or serial number that all mobile phones and smartphones have.

Prosecutors used data gathered from a large number of tech companies to put Narvaez’s phone in specific places near his home in Tracy, Calif. at the time his alleged victims reported having their phones hijacked. His alleged re-use of the same mobile device for multiple SIM hijacks ultimately gave him away:

“On 7/18/18, investigators received information from an AT&T investigator regarding unauthorized SIM swaps conducted through an AT&T authorized retailer. He reported that approximately 28 SIM swaps were conducted using the same employee ID number over an approximately two-week time period in November 2017. Records were obtained that included a list of IMEI numbers used to take over the victims’ cell phone numbers.”

“AT&T provided call detail records pertaining to the IMEI numbers listed to conduct the SIM swaps. One of those IMEI numbers, ending in 3218, was used to take over the cell phone of a resident of Illinois. I contacted the victim who verified that some of his accounts had been “hacked” in late 2017 but said he did not suffer any financial loss. Sgt. Tarazi analyzed the AT&T location data pertaining to that account takeover. That data indicated that on 7/27/17, when the victim from Illinois lost access to his accounts, the IMEI (ending in 3218) of the cell phone controlling the victim’s cell phone number was located in Tracy, California.”

“The specific tower is located approximately 0.6 miles away from the address 360 Yosemite Drive in Tracy. Several “NELOS” records (GPS coordinates logged by AT&T to estimate the location of devices on their network) indicate the phone was within 1000 meters of 360 Yosemite Drive in Tracy. AT&T also provided call detail records pertaining to Narvaez’ cell phone account, which was linked to him through financial services account records. Sgt. Tarazi examined those records and determined that Narvaez’ own cell phone was connected to the same tower and sector during approximately the same time frame that the suspect device (ending in 3218) was connected to the victim’s account.”

Apple responded to requests with records pertaining to customer accounts linked to that same suspect IMEI number. Those records identified three California residents whose Apple accounts were linked to that same IMEI number.

A snippet from a redacted “statement of facts” filed by prosecutors in the Narvaez case.

Verizon provided call detail records pertaining to the IMEI number ending in 3218. From the statement of facts:

These records that this phone had in fact been used to access the two Verizon numbers listed above, and at the same time was connected to a Verizon celltower located approximately 1.3 miles away from 360 Yosemite Drive in Tracy, CA. This cell tower was the closest Verizon tower to 360 Yosemite Drive.

“Records obtained from DMV indicated the 2018 McLaren was purchased from a car dealership in Southern California. Sale records obtained from the dealership indicated the payment for the vehicle was made by Tiffany Ross, primarily using bitcoin, accepted by the merchant processor BitPay on behalf of the dealership. The remainder of the price of the vehicle was financed through the trade-in of a 2012 Audi R8. The buyer/s listed email address was a Gmail address. Records also indicated the Audi R8 had been purchased in June 2017 by Xzavyer Narvaez. The entire balance for that vehicle was paid using bitcoin.”

“A different Gmail address was listed under the buyer’s contact information. Google provided records indicating both e-mail addresses used to pay for the vehicles belonged to Xzavyer Narvaez.”

“BitPay provided records that identified the Bitcoin transactions in which the vehicles were purchased. Investigator Berry utilized the Bitcoin blockchain, which is the distributed public ledger of all historical transactions on the Bitcoin network, to trace the flow of the bitcoins used to purchase the McLaren back to an address attributed to the cryptocurrency exchanger Bittrex.”

“Bittrex verified that funds from Bittrex to the output address identified in the blockchain that led to the purchase of the McLaren came from Narvaez’ account, and verified the address utilized for the deposit of bitcoin into that account. The Bitcoin blockchain currently indicates that Narvaez’ Bittrex deposit address has had more than 157 bitcoin flow through it, in 208 transactions, between 7/12/18 and 3/12/18. Based on the current market value of a bitcoin, 157 bitcoins are currently worth approximately S1,000,000.”

Narvaez faces four counts of using personal identifying information without authorization; four counts of altering and damaging computer data with intent to defraud or obtain money, or other value; and grand theft of personal property of a value over nine hundred and fifty thousand dollars. He is expected to issue a plea on Sept. 26, 2018. A copy of the charges against him is here (PDF).

Federal authorities also have been active in targeting SIM swappers of late. One day after Narvaez was apprehended, police in Florida arrested a 25-year-old man accused of being part of a group of about nine people that allegedly stole hundreds of thousands of dollars in virtual currencies from SIM swap victims. That case drew on collaboration with Homeland Security Investigations, which acted on a tip from a concerned mom in Michigan who overheard her son impersonating an AT&T employee and found bags of SIM cards in his room.

All of the major wireless companies let customers protect their accounts from SIM swapping by selecting a personal identification number (PIN) that is supposed to be required when account changes are requested in person or over the phone. But one big part of the problem is that many of these SIM swappers are working directly with retail mobile store employees who know how to bypass these protections.

If you’re concerned about the threat from SIM hijacking, experts say it might be time to disconnect your mobile phone number from important accounts. We discussed options for doing just that in last week’s column, Hanging Up on Mobile in the Name of Security.

Categories: Krebs