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Updated: 15 min 8 sec ago

AI-driven, large-scale nation-state campaign using ARTEX enables supply chain compromise

Wed, 10/21/2026 - 2:23pm
In this article
  1. What’s happening
  2. What is ARTEX?
  3. Mitigation and protection guidance
  4. References
  5. Learn more

As early as September 2026, Storm-0940, a China-state aligned actor, used the agentic AI penetration testing framework ARTEX to automate attacks targeting hundreds of organizations globally across a broad range of industries. Several of these Storm-0940 ARTEX-driven attacks have resulted in the actor obtaining privileged access to an organization’s cloud infrastructure – including multiple instances where the time from initial targeting to privileged access was less than 3 hours. Microsoft assesses that Storm-0940 was responsible for the recently disclosed ConnectWise supply chain compromise of a multi-tenant application.

This activity demonstrates how threat actors are integrating agentic AI into existing offensive security workflows and allows them to scale their operations exponentially. Agents are not constrained by factors affecting humans – they can work around the clock, on weekends, and on holidays and attempt multiple breach paths simultaneously enabling significantly reduced time from selecting a target to achieving objectives, increasing the speed and impact of complex attacks like supply chain compromises.

Storm-0940’s use of ARTEX accelerated the speed of compromised application abuse to authenticate to Microsoft 365 customer environments through applications that had already been granted access. This allowed the threat actor to operate without requiring an interactive user sign-in. In multiple affected environments, Microsoft observed AI-accelerated follow-on activity through Microsoft Graph, including reconnaissance, application credential changes, and attempts to modify privileges that could enable expanded or persistent access. The activity conducted by the threat actor through the usage of ARTEX framework did not result from a compromise of or a vulnerability in Microsoft corporate systems, products, or services.

Although Microsoft identified Storm-0940-initiated authentication and follow-on activity in multiple customer environments, the presence of an affected application or successful threat actor authentication does not necessarily indicate that customer data was accessed or exfiltrated. Microsoft Defender XDR provides detections and hunting queries for suspicious Microsoft Graph activity and activity associated with known threat infrastructure. Customers should review service principal sign-ins, investigate unexpected application credential or privilege changes, and follow ConnectWise’s published containment guidance while preserving relevant evidence for investigation. For a full list of detections please see the detections section.

What’s happening

Storm-0940 is a China-state aligned actor (with no known industry aliases) that has been active since 2021 and targets organizations across multiple industries for data theft. The actor has historically gained initial access using password spraying and exploitation of internet-facing applications, before using compromised accounts to move through targeted environments. In cloud environments, the actor has also established persistence by adding credentials to existing OAuth applications, allowing continued access to Microsoft 365 resources. The actor has used these applications to access and exfiltrate email and other data through Microsoft Graph.

As early as September 2026, Storm-0940 used the agentic AI penetration testing framework ARTEX to automate attacks targeting hundreds of organizations globally across a broad range of industries. These include aerospace and defense, automotive, chemicals, energy, financial services, government, legal, manufacturing, media, military, semiconductor, software, technology, and think tanks and non-profits. During the ConnectWise supply chain compromise, Storm-0940 used ARTEX to accelerate scanning and reconnaissance, password spraying, and OAuth application abuse at downstream victims.

Several of these Storm-0940 ARTEX-driven attacks have resulted in the actor obtaining privileged access to an organization’s cloud infrastructure – including multiple instances where the time from initial targeting to privileged access was less than 3 hours. When automated with AI, these activities generate a large volume of traffic and log data that may generate alerts. However, the speed of the activity allows very little time for Defenders to respond to those alerts and remediate the actor’s access in a coordinated fashion. Storm-0940’s activity illustrates how a threat actor with a broad target set can use an agentic AI tool and privileged authentication material to quickly attempt to compromise many organizations. While the majority of the targeting wasn’t successful, Storm-0940 achieved privileged cloud persistence at many organizations in a brief time.

What is ARTEX?

ARTEX is an open-source penetration testing framework that can use any AI model to automate a variety of offensive security workflows. The ARTEX framework is a multi-agent LLM system written in GO with a Next.js frontend. While the UI and generated output default to English, the framework can be switched to Korean, Mandarin, Spanish, or Japanese. ARTEX is a system of LLM-driven agents that run an autonomous penetration test from reconnaissance through data exfiltration with little needed human interaction. The agents then accumulate the discovered assets and vulnerabilities into a graph during the penetration test. In October 2026, public reporting noted that the ARTEX framework was being used by threat actors, such as the personal data breaches targeting Korean financial institutions. Microsoft Threat Intelligence has identified threat actors across multiple geographic regions leveraging the ARTEX framework.

On October 16, 2026, ConnectWise publicly reported unauthorized access to its customers’ tenants using multiple OAuth application identities. Following the unauthorized access, Storm-0940 used ARTEX to reach more than 2,250 tenants at 2,900 sign-in attempts per minute, a pace that leaves defenders with little time to detect and respond. While OAuth application abuse is a typical part of Storm-0940’s toolset, in this case the actor used ARTEX to accelerate the activity to machine speed.

Figure 1. Scale and speed of a subset of Storm-0940’s automated ARTEX campaign on downstream tenants, including tenant reach and rapid sign-ins. Password Spraying

Between October 10 and 14, 2026, Storm-0940 infrastructure at 144.172.64[.]99 conducted an automated cross-tenant password-spray campaign targeting 327 accounts across eight organizations to gain access to Microsoft 365 and Exchange Online. During this large campaign, Microsoft telemetry captured 151,000+ failed logon events, with activity peaking on October 11 at 2,900 failures per minute and concentrating more than 111,000 failures into a single day. The campaign blended broad, low-rate account spraying with sustained, high-volume authentication attempts against selected identities; 48 accounts received more than 1,000 failures, and lockout responses represented nearly 98% of all activity. Despite the scale, no successful authentication, token issuance, Graph call, or directory change was observed.

Downstream customer access

On October 15, immediately after this notable activity, public reports of the compromise of the popular cloud backup application ConnectWise started to surface with direct references to indicators of compromise matching the same network range observed for the earlier password-spray campaign (144.172.64.x). An advisory from the affected cloud backup vendor posted on October 16 shared later additional indicators with one IP address matching exactly the 144.172.64[.]99 infrastructure responsible for the earlier password-spray campaign.

Additionally, after acquiring control of the identities of multiple ConnectWise cloud applications, the AI agents operating on behalf of the threat actor continued to use the same IP range to authenticate to customer environments using the illicit access acquired through these stolen app credentials, effectively taking advantage of the already established trust by these apps within a tenant. In some of these environments, the AI agents (on behalf of the threat actor) progressed beyond authentication to Microsoft Graph and directory operations, including reconnaissance, application credential modifications to establish persistence, and changes involving identities, groups, and privileged roles. Microsoft identified multiple customer environments with evidence of follow-on activity, highlighting how a compromised third-party application with high privileges could provide access beyond its originally intended purpose.

The application credential modification made by Storm-0940’s associated agents in the targeted victims’ environments can lead to persistence through other identities, credentials, and cloud services. These changes can remain active as a backdoor even after the original compromised application is mediated. Organizations should examine service principal sign-ins alongside subsequent Microsoft Graph activity, directory changes, and resource access, correlating suspicious events with authorized administrative activity. The presence of an affected application, or even successful authentication, does not necessarily indicate unauthorized data access or data exfiltration.

Mitigation and protection guidance

Microsoft recommends the following mitigations to reduce the impact of this threat. Check the recommendations card for the deployment status of monitored mitigations.

Immediate actions
  • Keep affected ConnectWise application connections disabled until ConnectWise provides formal restoration instructions.
  • Do not delete enterprise applications as the first response. Preserve configuration and evidence before making irreversible changes.
  • Inventory all four application IDs listed in this profile and record the local service-principal Object ID in each tenant.
  • Review every Microsoft 365 tenant where the affected applications are currently or were previously installed or authorized, even if the integration is no longer in use. Search by application ID rather than display name.
  • Preserve available Microsoft Entra sign-in and audit records, Microsoft Purview Audit records, SIEM data, and previously configured Microsoft Graph telemetry. Do not delay urgent containment while waiting for exports.
  • Review activity starting from at least October 15, 2026. Where records are available, extend service-principal sign-in review to October 1 and investigate earlier related activity, including failed authentications and volume anomalies.
  • Review successful and failed service-principal sign-ins separately. Investigate unfamiliar sources and activity outside expected vendor infrastructure; do not limit review to the published IPs.
  • Review Microsoft Entra audit records for application or service-principal credential additions; new applications, service principals, or owners; app-role assignments and consent grants; privileged role assignments; and changes to users, groups, authentication methods, or Conditional Access. On confirmed suspicious activity, revoke unnecessary permissions and rotate credentials.
  • Review Microsoft 365 audit records to look for reconnaissance activities like listing directories, permissions, and approvals coming from unusual IPs.
  • Review Microsoft 365 audit records for unusual mail or file access, downloads, forwarding, inbox or transport rules, delegated mailbox permissions, and related resource activity.
  • Preserve evidence, then have an appropriately authorized responder remove confirmed unauthorized credentials, grants, owners, assignments, and identities.
Additional recommendations
  • Threat actor misuse of AI accelerates risk across enterprise environments by amplifying existing threats such as exploitation of vulnerabilities, phishing, malware threats, and insider activity. To help organizations stay ahead of AI-enabled threat activity, Microsoft has introduced the Security Dashboard for AI. The dashboard provides users with a unified view of AI security posture by aggregating security, identity, and data risk across Microsoft Defender, Microsoft Entra, and Microsoft Purview. This allows organizations to understand what AI assets exist in their environment, recognize emerging risk patterns, and prioritize governance and security across AI agents, applications, and platforms. To learn more about the Microsoft Security Dashboard for AI see: Assess your organization’s AI risk with Microsoft Security Dashboard for AI (Preview).
  • Enable threat protection for AI services in Microsoft Defender for Cloud to identify threats to generative AI applications in real time and for assistance in responding to security issues.
  • Apply least privilege to multi-tenant application permissions and consent grants.
  • Monitor credential additions, privilege assignments, and anomalous app-only activity, especially to applications with high privileged permissions and scopes.
  • Verify that vendor credential rotation and any tenant-level remediation eliminated remaining unauthorized access.

Assess the operational effect on backup and restore workflows and follow current ConnectWise restoration guidance.

Microsoft Defender XDR detections

Microsoft Defender XDR customers can refer to the list of applicable detections below. Microsoft Defender XDR coordinates detection, prevention, investigation, and response across endpoints, identities, email, and apps to provide integrated protection against attacks like the threat discussed in this blog.

Customers with provisioned access can also use Microsoft Security Copilot in Microsoft Defender to investigate and respond to incidents, hunt for threats, and protect their organization with relevant threat intelligence.

Tactic Observed activity Microsoft Defender coverage (Alert title)
DiscoveryUnusual behavior attributes were observed from Graph API activity originating from associated ConnectWise Application.Unusual Microsoft Graph activity associated with Compromised ConnectWise Application Privilege Escalation Persistence

Initial Access/Valid Accounts ConnectWise Management Application directly granted itself the Global Administrator role through the Add member to role operation, with no prior Global Administrator self-assignment observed for the same application in the preceding 7 days.Application self-assigned Global Administrator role DiscoveryGraph API activity for the user originated from an active, production Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center IP indicator.Graph API activity from a Microsoft threat intelligence IP addressValid Accounts

A user sign-in from a nation-state threat actor infrastructure has been detected from this account. A threat actor might have compromised the user account to gain unauthorized access and conducted other malicious activities in your system. Investigate promptly to mitigate security risks. Suspicious sign-in from verified nation-state threat actor infrastructure Steal Application Access Token

A sign-in was observed from a known threat actor IP address. We recommend promptly investigating this alert, as a threat actor might already be using the stolen credentials to move laterally in the network. Malicious sign-in from known threat actor IP address Microsoft Defender for Cloud Apps detections Tactic Observed activityMicrosoft Defender coverage (Alert title)PersistenceAn application or service principal was granted a highly privileged app role.Suspicious addition of app role assignments to service principal Collection High-volume mailbox access by an OAuth app after a suspicious role grant.Suspicious mail access activity by OAuth application following role assignmentCollectionA suspicious OAuth app that was added recently started accessing the Teams Messages folder using an email client.Newly added OAuth application accessing Teams Messages folder via email clientCredential Access An OAuth application activity from an uncommonly visited ISP has been observed, indicating potential suspicious behavior.OAuth application activity from an uncommonly visited ISPExfiltrationOAuth applications seen performing extensive Microsoft Graph SharePoint enumeration activities shortly after application creation or modification eventsSuspicious OAuth application created from a risky user context performing graph SharePoint enumerationPrivilege Escalation Risky permissions that enable user to act as other entities or escalate to Global Admin provided to Service PrincipalHigh-privilege application roles assigned to a service principal Persistence A service principal added an application role assignment to itselfSuspicious addition of application role assignments by service principal to itself Microsoft Security Copilot

Security Copilot customers can use the standalone experience to create their own prompts or run the following prebuilt promptbooks to automate incident response or investigation tasks related to this threat:

  • Incident investigation
  • Threat actor profile
  • Threat Intelligence 360 report based on MDTI article

Note that some promptbooks require access to plugins for Microsoft products such as Microsoft Defender XDR or Microsoft Sentinel.

Threat intelligence reports

Microsoft customers can use the following reports in Microsoft products to get the most up-to-date information about the threat actor, malicious activity, and techniques discussed in this blog. These reports provide intelligence, protection information, and recommended actions to prevent, mitigate, or respond to associated threats found in customer environments.

Microsoft Defender XDR Threat analytics

Activity Profile: ConnectWise Cloud Backup credential abuse: assessment and response guidance

Indicators of compromise (IOC) IndicatorTypeDescription144.172.64[.]128IPThese IPs were seen performing Sign-ins and Graph API activity in customer environments of ConnectWise apps.144.172.64[.]99IP144.172.64[.]60IP187.15.88[.]186 187.15.90[.]217 187.15.89[.]186 IPThese IPs were seen accessing the Graph API via the compromised apps. However, since they are VPN IPs, it is transient and relevant for investigation on October 15 and 16 in context with compromised applications.Python-urllib/3.12User AgentThese user agents were seen performing Sign-ins and Graph API activity on customer environments using ConnectWise apps.python-requests/2.31.0User Agentpython-requests/2.34.2User Agentcurl/7.88.1User Agentazure-toolkit/1.0User Agent Advanced hunting

NOTE: The following sample queries let you search for a week’s worth of events. To explore up to 30 days’ worth of raw data to inspect events in your network and locate potential indicators related to this campaign for more than a week, go to the Advanced Hunting page > Query tab, select the calendar dropdown menu to update your query to hunt for the Last 30 days.

Microsoft Defender XDR advanced hunting

1- OAuthAppInfo → Is the affected app present, enabled, and what permissions does it hold?

Start with OAuthAppInfo to determine whether any of the affected ConnectWise applications are present in the tenant and understand the access they have been granted. The query identifies the application and its tenant-specific service principal, whether it is enabled, its privilege level, consent information, and the individual permissions assigned to it. This establishes the customer’s potential exposure and gives investigators the ServicePrincipalId needed for further hunting. A match does not mean the application was abused, only that it is present and potentially had access, so the next step is to determine whether the service principal was actually used. Run query

let ConnectWiseApps = dynamic([ "506e08f9-6e9a-4da4-942b-a099a03644ae", // ConnectWise Cloud Backup "24205314-2b89-4e07-a2a4-579e898a5640", // ConnectWise - MS Teams "0de14c77-b9b0-4137-9360-34878a929827", // ConnectWise - MS Graph "c921256f-04a7-44e8-9b2a-69c33929ba19" // SkyKick Partner Portal ]); OAuthAppInfo | where OAuthAppId in (ConnectWiseApps) | mv-expand Permission = Permissions | extend PermissionName = tostring(Permission.PermissionName), TargetApp = tostring(Permission.TargetAppDisplayName), TargetAppId = tostring(Permission.TargetAppId), PermissionType = tostring(Permission.PermissionType), PermissionPrivilegeLevel = tostring(Permission.PrivilegeLevel), UsageStatus = tostring(Permission.UsageStatus) | project AppName, OAuthAppId, ServicePrincipalId, AppStatus, PrivilegeLevel, IsAdminConsented, PermissionName, PermissionType, PermissionPrivilegeLevel, TargetApp, TargetAppId, UsageStatus | order by AppName asc, PermissionPrivilegeLevel desc

2 – EntraIdSpnSignInEvents + GraphAPIAuditEvents → Did the service principal authenticate, and what Microsoft Graph activity followed?

Use this query to investigate service-principal sign-ins and Microsoft Graph API activity associated with the identified ConnectWise applications and suspicious IP addresses, starting October 13, 2026.

The query combines both event types into a chronological view, helping defenders identify suspicious authentication and related Graph operations, including potential credential changes, privilege modifications, and unusual resource access. Remove the IP filter for broader hunting. Results require further correlation, as authentication alone does not establish compromise. Run query

let Apps = dynamic([ "506e08f9-6e9a-4da4-942b-a099a03644ae", "24205314-2b89-4e07-a2a4-579e898a5640", "0de14c77-b9b0-4137-9360-34878a929827", "c921256f-04a7-44e8-9b2a-69c33929ba19" ]); let IPs = dynamic(["144.172.64.60", "144.172.64.99", "144.172.64.128"]); union kind=outer (EntraIdSpnSignInEvents | extend EventType = "Sign-in"), (GraphAPIAuditEvents | extend EventType = "Graph API", IPAddress = IpAddress) | where Timestamp >= datetime(2026-10-13) | where ApplicationId in (Apps) | where IPAddress in (IPs) // Comment out for broader hunting | project-away IpAddress | order by Timestamp asc Sentinel hunting queries

1-SigninLogs → Did a service principal authenticate, from where, and against what resource?

Use SigninLogs to determine whether an affected application identity actually authenticated. This moves the investigation from potential exposure to observed authentication, allowing defenders to examine the application and service principal alongside the source IP address, geographic information, authentication result, and resource being accessed. Investigators should evaluate these sign-ins against the application’s expected activity and look for unusual source infrastructure, resources, or authentication patterns before pivoting into subsequent Graph activity. Run query

let IPIndicators = dynamic([ "144.172.64.60", // IP Indicator "144.172.64.99", // IP Indicator "144.172.64.128" // IP Indicator ]); let ConnectWiseApps = dynamic([ "506e08f9-6e9a-4da4-942b-a099a03644ae", // ConnectWise Cloud Backup "24205314-2b89-4e07-a2a4-579e898a5640", // ConnectWise - MS Teams "0de14c77-b9b0-4137-9360-34878a929827", // ConnectWise - MS Graph "c921256f-04a7-44e8-9b2a-69c33929ba19" // SkyKick Partner Portal ]); SigninLogs | where TimeGenerated >= datetime(2026-10-13) | where AppId in (ConnectWiseApps) //| where IPAddress in (IPIndicators) // Comment out to review all activity from these applications | project TimeGenerated, AppId, ServicePrincipalName, ResourceDisplayName, ResourceId, IPAddress, CorrelationId | order by TimeGenerated asc

2 – MicrosoftGraphActivityLogs → What observable Graph API activity followed?

Use MicrosoftGraphActivityLogs to investigate observable Microsoft Graph activity following authentication. This query allows defenders to pivot on the affected ApplicationId or tenant-specific ServicePrincipalId and examine details such as the request URI, HTTP method, response status, scopes, source IP address, and target workload. This helps establish what Graph activity occurred after the service principal authenticated and provides additional context around the resources the application attempted to access.

Importantly, the absence of results should not be treated as confirmation that no access occurred; Graph API telemetry should be considered alongside the application permissions and service principal authentication activity identified in the previous hunting steps. Run query

let IPIndicators = dynamic([ "144.172.64.60", // IP Indicator "144.172.64.99", // IP Indicator "144.172.64.128" // IP Indicator ]); let ConnectWiseApps = dynamic([ "506e08f9-6e9a-4da4-942b-a099a03644ae", // ConnectWise Cloud Backup "24205314-2b89-4e07-a2a4-579e898a5640", // ConnectWise - MS Teams "0de14c77-b9b0-4137-9360-34878a929827", // ConnectWise - MS Graph "c921256f-04a7-44e8-9b2a-69c33929ba19" // SkyKick Partner Portal ]); MicrosoftGraphActivityLogs | where TimeGenerated >= datetime(2026-10-13) | where AppId in (ConnectWiseApps) | where IPAddress in (IPIndicators) // Comment out to review all Graph activity from these applications | project TimeGenerated, AppId, IPAddress, RequestMethod, RequestUri, ResponseStatusCode, Scopes, ClientRequestId, OperationId, RequestId | order by TimeGenerated asc MITRE ATT&CK Techniques observed

This threat has exhibited use of the following attack techniques. For standard industry documentation about these techniques, refer to the MITRE ATT&CK framework.

Reconnaissance

Initial Access

Privilege Escalation

Credential Access

Discovery

References Learn more

The post AI-driven, large-scale nation-state campaign using ARTEX enables supply chain compromise appeared first on Microsoft Security Blog.

Categories: Microsoft

Agents are your newest insiders. Security must move at their speed. 

Mon, 10/19/2026 - 9:00am

Agents are rapidly becoming part of how work gets done. They can support a range of activities from writing code and researching products to analyzing revenue, processing expenses, and acting across the systems that run the business. To be most useful, they often need access to company data, applications, tools, and other agents. That access is what makes agents more capable. With that capability can come insider risk.

This does not mean agents are inherently malicious. It means they are capable tools that can be granted access to important systems by users. They can make mistakes, be manipulated, or be compromised. Their models can produce variable outputs, their context can change, and their plans can evolve as they work. An agent that operates as intended when a task begins may respond differently as context or inputs change. Depending on how they are designed and deployed, agents can operate continuously, at machine speed and scale.

Satya Nadella, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of Microsoft, recently described the trust architecture this new era requires: we must separate the supply of intelligence from the authority over it. We should not ask a model to be its own security authority. The controls that determine what it can access, what actions it can take, and whether it should continue operating must sit outside the model, where the model cannot bypass or tamper with them.

“The most trustworthy agentic system will not be the one with the model we trust most. It will be the one designed that enables us to trust the model least.”

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We introduced Project Perception and the Microsoft cyber stack to help organizations defend with agents. Today, we are extending Perception to secure the agentic insider. Guardian Agents help security teams operate continuously, at machine speed and scale, while sensors, context, and actuators across the cyber stack help understand changing agent risk and continuously adapt protection in response. Project Perception and Microsoft Agent 365 share signals, context, and a unified registry giving IT and security teams a consistent view of agents and risk, with the controls each needs.

This builds on a simple security principle: surround non-deterministic intelligence with deterministic controls, independent evidence, and containment boundaries. Assume an agent can fail or be compromised. Observe it continuously. Minimize and tailor its authority before it acts. And continuously adjust that authority as risk changes.

This requires protection across identity, permissions, data, endpoints, network, cloud, and runtime. The system has four continuous responsibilities:

  • Know which agents exist, who owns them, why they exist, and what they are doing.
  • Contain what each agent can access and do before it acts.
  • Protect the data, tools, runtime, resources, and systems in the agent’s path.
  • Adapt protection continuously as behavior, context, and risk change.

These are not four products or sequential phases. They operate together. Evidence changes risk. Risk changes policy. Policy changes what the agent is allowed to do. Consider an expense-approval agent. It may need to read expense submissions, check policy, and approve routine reimbursements, but it should not inherit every permission of the employee who sponsors it. Its identity, runtime, access paths, and task-scoped authority should be explicit from the start. If it later encounters a prompt injection or attempts an action outside that task, the system should respond proportionately: preserve safe reads while blocking writes, narrow the resources it can reach, require provable human approval for a consequential step, or isolate and stop the agent when the risk warrants it. This is what continuous containment looks like in practice.

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You cannot secure what you cannot see. Agents can be created through Microsoft platforms, integrated through partner platforms and software development kits (SDKs), or introduced locally without a central deployment process. Microsoft Security uses native integrations, connectors, and sensors across the cyber stack to discover more of the agent estate.

We are expanding discovery to 35 additional types of local agents, bringing the total to 60 supported local agents, including Claude Code, OpenAI Codex, and GitHub Copilot. Organizations can bring these agents into a unified registry, regardless of how they were discovered, to understand ownership, activity, and risk.

Discovery tells you that an agent exists. Identity gives security and governance systems a durable anchor for controlling it.

Every agent should have a first-class identity distinct from the person using or sponsoring it. We are extending Microsoft Entra Agent ID with identity types for additional agent patterns, including local and previously unknown agents discovered through security sensors. This means an agent can become a policy target even when it was not originally integrated with Microsoft Security. Agent identity anchors attribution, ownership, lifecycle, risk, permissions, authorization, and policy, so the enterprise can distinguish what a person did from what an agent did on that person’s behalf.

Contain what the agent can do before it acts

Being able to find and identify an agent is necessary, but it is just the start. We need to understand the potential impact the agent can have in the enterprise environment. The next step is to bound the agent across its runtime, its paths to tools and resources, and the authority it can exercise.

Contain the runtime

The model and harness should execute inside a controlled environment rather than inherit fully-privileged access to the device. Sandboxes such as Microsoft Execution Container (MXC) provide policy-controlled access to resources the agent needs to complete its task. They also create an enforcement boundary where security controls and observability can operate outside the agent’s reach. If the agent or harness is compromised, it should not be able to disable the controls watching it.

Control the action space

An agent should not be free to call any tool, API, Model Context Protocol (MCP) server, resource, or other agent it can find. Local and network and data controls must mediate those paths, observe the calls, and enforce enterprise policy. Controlling the destination alone is not enough. Security must also understand the content flowing into and out of the agent, including its sensitivity, provenance, and whether untrusted data may be influencing the agent’s behavior.

Start with no permissions, or least privilege

We have spent decades applying Zero Trust and least privilege to people. Agents make those principles even more important. An agent should not automatically inherit all the standing access of its user. It should begin with no authority and receive only what it needs for the approved task, for only as long as the task requires.

To enable this, we are introducing Dynamic Permissions. Organization-wide policy sets the outer boundary, including preventing an agent from obtaining authority its user does not have. Permissions can then be scoped to the task, made time-bound, and contracted or removed as the task changes or completes. Higher-impact actions can require verified human approval.

The employee retains the employee’s access. The agent receives its own identity, permissions and its own authority scoped to its current task and for the duration of the task only.

Adapt protection as agent risk changes

Least privilege reduces exposure, but it does not eliminate risk. An expense-approval agent may begin a task with the right access and then encounter a prompt injection in an external document. Its configuration has not changed, but its behavior and risk have.

For human users, a delay between detection and response may be manageable. For an agent operating at machine speed, it can be the difference between containment and impact. The security system must be able to understand what changed and act before a person can manually investigate every signal.

That is why we are introducing Dynamic Agent Risk and Dynamic Conditional Access for agents.

Dynamic Agent Risk

Dynamic Agent Risk combines signals from identity, data, endpoints, cloud, network, runtime, and the agent’s own activity. It considers how securely the agent is configured, what resources it can reach, the potential impact if something goes wrong, and whether its actions are drifting from the user’s or organization’s intent.

The result is not a one-time score assigned at onboarding. It is a continuously updated understanding of the agent’s current risk and whether its current authority still matches that risk. The question is not simply whether the agent should run or stop. It is what the agent should be allowed to read, change, invoke, or approve at that moment.

Dynamic Conditional Access

Dynamic Conditional Access extends Microsoft Entra Conditional Access for agents so a change in risk can drive coordinated action across multiple enforcement points. The response is graduated, not binary. Policy can reduce permissions, preserve reads while blocking writes, narrow the data and resources the agent can reach, restrict network paths, shorten or revoke time-bound access, or require provable human approval before a consequential action proceeds. At the highest levels of risk, it can isolate the runtime or stop execution entirely.

Return to the expense agent. It begins with narrowly scoped permission to review and approve expenses within policy. When it encounters untrusted content and attempts an unrelated action, new evidence raises its Dynamic Agent Risk. Policy responds proportionately: it can preserve read access while removing the ability to approve or write, block access to sensitive resources, and require cryptographically provable human approval for a high-impact step. If the risk continues to rise, the system can isolate the runtime or stop execution. The employee remains productive. The agent is constrained without treating every risk change as a kill-switch event.

Secure agentic systems at scale with Guardian Agents

As organizations deploy thousands or hundreds of thousands of agents, manually triaging every alert and coordinating every response will not scale. Securing agents must itself become agentic, while remaining inside boundaries people set.

That is why we are introducing new Playbooks and a team of Guardian Agents in Project Perception. People define policy, approval boundaries, and delegation rules. Playbooks define the desired security outcome and coordinate protective actions. Guardian Agents carry out the work at machine speed, adapting as agent activity, risk, security context, and organizational policy change.

Guardian Agents can help teams understand why risk changed, investigate the relevant evidence, recommend or apply containment, and use what they learn to harden policy. This is not about outsourcing judgment. People retain control over objectives and consequential decisions. The system carries the continuous work that does not scale through manual operations.

Agents will only be adopted at scale if they can be trusted at scale. At Microsoft, we are already operating in a world of hundreds of thousands of agents. As Customer Zero, we have learned that securing agents requires continuous visibility into agent activity, proactive protection of access and data, and adaptive protection that keeps pace with evolving threats. Those lessons directly inform the innovations we are delivering to help every organization adopt agents with confidence.”

—Terrell Cox, Corporate Vice President (CVP) and Deputy Chief Information Security Officer (CISO), Customer Security, Microsoft

Extending containment to the model

As model transparency increases, it creates a new source of security evidence. Chain-of-thought and other model-level signals can help identify intent drift, understand whether untrusted information is influencing reasoning, and detect when an agent’s planned actions are diverging from the task it was given.

We are bringing this deeper evidence into Dynamic Agent Risk, together with signals from across the cyber stack. This builds on Satya Nadella’s principle: increase transparency into the model while keeping security decisions and enforcement independent of it.

Greater model transparency gives security systems deeper evidence to detect suspicious behavior and inform Dynamic Agent Risk. But the core security principle does not change: the model cannot be its own security boundary. Independent systems must observe every layer, including the model itself, and ultimately determine and enforce what the system is allowed to do.

These are not separate pillars. They make the same containment architecture stronger: better evidence, stronger assurance, more accurate risk, and more effective protection.

Confidence to move faster

Organizations are adopting agents to serve customers better, solve problems faster, and give people more time for the work that matters most. The goal is not to make every model perfectly predictable before it can be useful. The goal is to build systems that remain secure even when the model is not.

That requires a clear division of responsibility. Models supply intelligence. People and organizations retain authority. Independent controls establish identity, limit privilege, protect data, preserve evidence, and contain unsafe action. Security continuously reassesses risk and adapts protection as the agent works.

You should not have to choose
between innovation and safety.

That is what we are working toward: an agentic world where organizations can put intelligence to work with confidence because security can observe it, govern it, and contain it at the same speed.

Learn more here and join us at Microsoft Ignite.

To learn more about Microsoft Security solutions, visit our website. Bookmark the Security blog to keep up with our expert coverage on security matters. Also, follow us on LinkedIn (Microsoft Security) and X (@MSFTSecurity) for the latest news and updates on cybersecurity.

The post Agents are your newest insiders. Security must move at their speed.  appeared first on Microsoft Security Blog.

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